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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Bouguezzi, Fehmi; EL ELJ, Moez |
| Abstract: | The present paper studies and compares different vertical integration structures on consumers and total surplus with licensing by mean of a fixed fee in two successive homogeneous-good Cournot duopolies where one of the firms in each market has a different cost-reducing innovation. The key difference between the present model and models in the existing literature is that here we suppose the existence of two different patents in upstream and downstream markets. In each market we find two firms: the patent holding firm and a non innovative firm. In upstream market, the innovative firm owns an innovation allowing to reduce the input marginal production cost. In downstream market the innovative firm owns an innovation allowing to reduce marginal cost of transforming the input into output. We discuss different structures of vertical integration and we show that consumer surplus and total surplus are depending of cost-reducing innovation in upstream and downstream markets and the structure of vertical integration. |
| Keywords: | Cournot successive markets; Fee licensing; Vertical integration; process innovation |
| JEL: | D23 O32 O31 L22 L24 |
| Date: | 2009–06–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:22212&r=tid |
| By: | Andersson, Martin (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology); Baltzopoulos, Apostolos (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology); Lööf, Hans (CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies, Royal Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes how different R&D strategies of incumbent firms affect the quantity and quality of their entrepreneurial spawning. By examining entrepreneurial ventures of ex-employees of firms with different R&D strategies three things emerge: First, firms with persistent R&D investments with a general superiority in sales, exports, productivity, profitability and wages are less likely to generate entrepreneurs than firm with temporary or no R&D investments. Second, start-ups from knowledge intensive business service (KIBS) firms with persistent R&D investments have a significantly increased probability of survival. No corresponding association between the R&D strategies of incumbents and survival of entrepreneurial spawns is found for incumbents in manufacturing sectors. Third, spin-outs from KIBS-firms are more likely to survive if they start in the same firm, indicating the importance of inherited related knowledge. The findings suggest that R&D intensive firms spur fewer entrepreneurs, but their entrepreneurial spawns tend to be of higher quality. |
| Keywords: | entrepreneurship; self-employment; R&D strategy; innovation; new firms; spin-off; spin-out |
| JEL: | J24 L26 M13 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2010–04–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0228&r=tid |
| By: | Erzo G. J. Luttmer (Department of Economics, University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota) |
| Abstract: | Although employment at individual firms tends to be highly non-stationary, the employment size distribution of all firms in the United States appears to be stationary. It closely resembles a Pareto distribution. There is a lot of entry and exit, mostly of small firms. This paper surveys general equilibrium models that can be used to interpret these facts and explores the role of innovation by new and incumbent firms in determining aggregate growth. The existence of a balanced growth path with a stationary employment size distribution depends crucially on assumptions made about the cost of entry. Some type of labor must be an essential input in setting up new firms. |
| Keywords: | firm size distribution, organization capital, heterogeneous productivity, selection. |
| JEL: | L1 O4 |
| Date: | 2010–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:min:wpaper:2010-1&r=tid |
| By: | Manel Antelo (Universidad de Santiago de Compostela) |
| Abstract: | A patent holder owning a two-period lasting innovation is unable to push it into the market, so it is licensed to a downstream user with production capabilities to market it. The production cost of this firm can be low or high, but the patent holder has only a prior on this fact |
| Keywords: | Licensing, asymmetric information, screening, signaling |
| JEL: | D82 L12 L13 L14 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cea:doctra:e2010_05&r=tid |
| By: | Jacques Mairesse; Pierre Mohnen |
| Abstract: | After presenting the history, the evolution and the content of innovation surveys, we discuss the characteristics of the data they contain and the challenge they pose to the analyst and the econometrician. We document the two uses that have been made of these data: the construction of scoreboards for monitoring innovation and the scholarly analysis of various issue related to innovation. In particular we review the questions examined and the results obtained regarding the determinants, the effects, the complementarities, and the dynamics of innovation. We conclude by suggesting ways to improve the data collection and their econometric analysis. <P>Dans cet article de survol sur les utilisations des enquêtes innovation, nous commençons par présenter leur historique et les informations qu’elles apportent. Nous discutons en détail les caractéristiques des données fournies et les difficultés qu’elles peuvent poser pour les analyses. Nous considérons successivement les deux usages auxquelles ces données servent principalement : la construction d'indicateurs et de « scoreboard » de l'innovation et les études économétriques sur différents thèmes ayant trait à l'innovation. Nous passons ainsi en revue les questions posées et les résultats obtenus par les études sur les déterminants de l’innovation, sur ses effets, sur les complémentarités entre types d’innovation et sur sa dynamique. Nous concluons par une liste de suggestions pour améliorer la conception et l’organisation des enquêtes innovation et pour progresser dans leur analyse économétrique. |
| Keywords: | innovation survey, econometrics, complementarity, productivity, R&D, collaboration. , enquêtes innovation, économetrie, complémentarité, productivité, R&D, collaboration |
| JEL: | O30 O50 C35 C81 |
| Date: | 2010–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2010s-15&r=tid |
| By: | Thorsten Hansen (University of Munich) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of innovation on the organizational structure. The theoretical framework predicts that a larger parental pool of knowledge raises the probability of offshoring. This holds in a national as well as an international context. However, when the producer loses territorial protection, the changeover from non-integration to integration is delayed. Employing data on German firms investing in Eastern Europe finds empirical evidence for the theoretical predictions. The results are robust to different measurements and an instrumental variable regression. |
| JEL: | D23 D51 F23 L14 L21 L22 L23 |
| Date: | 2010–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:315&r=tid |
| By: | Giovanni Villani |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a real option methodology for evaluating R&D investment opportunities assuming that potential competitors can en- ter in the market. As it is well known, R&D investments are made often in a phased manner and so each stage creates an opportunity (option) for subsequent investment. Therefore, R&D projects can be consid- ered as ‘Compound Exchange Options' in which investments present uncertainty both in the gross project value and in costs. According to Majd and Pindyck (1987), in a real options context, “div- idends” are the opportunity costs inherent in the decision to defer an investment project and so deferment implies the loss of project's cash flows. Moreover, Trigeorgis (1996) incorporates the preemption effect through the “competitive dividends” which are the cash flows that can be eroded by anticipated competitive arrivals. In this paper we propose to value, using Montecarlo simulation, the R&D investments of a pioneer firm assuming that the Development cost can be spent in two moments: t2 or t3. If the Develpment cost is realized in t2 no firms enters in the market since the rivals' R&D plan is not yet concluded otherwise, if the investment D is delayed at time t3 waiting better market conditions, other rivals can enter in the market and so the opportunity costs (“dividends”) increase. |
| Keywords: | Real options; R&D; Monte Carlo methods; Competitive dividends. |
| JEL: | G13 O32 C15 D40 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:21-2009&r=tid |