nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2010‒04‒04
two papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Corporate governance and innovation: an organizational perspective By Belloc, Filippo
  2. Price and Quality Competition By Chioveanu, Ioana

  1. By: Belloc, Filippo
    Abstract: Traditional economic studies of innovation, built on the contribution of Schumpeter, cannot explain why firms of the same size and market power can show largely different innovation performances. Contrastingly, the literature on corporate governance provides some useful insights for understanding corporate innovation activity, to the extent that such literature examines the economic consequences of different modes of coordination between firm participants. The process through which individuals integrate their human and physical resources within the firm is indeed central to the dynamic of corporate innovation. This paper provides the first survey of the literature on this issue. We start by discussing why a theory of the firm must be put at the base of an economic analysis of corporate innovation. We then describe three main channels – corporate ownership, corporate finance and labour – through which a system of corporate governance shapes firm innovation activity. Finally, we examine the recent literature on national structures of governance.
    Keywords: corporate governance; innovation; theory of the firm; specific investments
    JEL: D23 O16 G30 O31
    Date: 2010–01–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:21495&r=tid
  2. By: Chioveanu, Ioana
    Abstract: This study considers an oligopoly model with simultaneous price and quality choice. Ex-ante homogeneous sellers compete by offering products at one of two quality levels. The consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality: for some consumers it is efficient to buy a high quality product, while for others it is efficient to buy a low quality product. In the symmetric equilibrium firms use mixed strategies that randomize both price and quality, and obtain strictly positive profits. This framework highlights trade-offs which determine the impact of consumer protection policy in the form of quality standards.
    Keywords: Oligopoly; Price and quality competition; Quality standards
    JEL: L5 L13 L15
    Date: 2009–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:21647&r=tid

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