nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2010‒03‒28
six papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Competing Technologies and Industry Evolution: The Benefits of Making Mistakes in the Flat Panel Display Industry By J.P. Eggers
  2. Endogenous network formation in patent contests and its role as a barrier to entry By MARINUCCI, Marco; VERGOTE, Wouter
  3. Dynamic Changes in Market Structure and Competition in the Corn and Soybean Seed Sector By Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce
  4. Competition among the big and the small By SHIMOMURA, Ken-Ichi; THISSE, Jacques-Franois
  5. Starting an R&D project under uncertainty By Dobbelaere, Sabien; Luttens, Roland Iwan; Peters, Bettina
  6. EQUILIBRIUM PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS Competition and R&D Incentives By Federico Etro; Michela Cella

  1. By: J.P. Eggers
    Abstract: Managers at firms facing uncertain competing technologies evolving concurrently face a complex decision set, including options to invest in one technology or other, both technologies, or to wait to invest. This study investigates the role that experience, learning and timing play in affecting the firm-level pros and cons of each of these four strategies in a technological competition situation. Using a unique data set on the evolution of the global flat panel display industry, this study offers an example where firms that initially support the losing technology but later switch to the dominant technology actually exhibit the best performance. The study also suggests two simultaneous reasons for this advantage. First, there is a late mover advantage based on the timing of the technological commitments made by firms. Second, there is an early-mover advantage in broad technological learning that manifests as an increased ability to innovate, and this advantage is roughly one-third to one-half the size of the late mover advantage. Tracking the evolution of competition in flat panel displays, organizational decisions, and both product- and firm-level outcomes, this study provides insight into the competing factors that constrain and motivate managerial decision-making.
    Date: 2010
  2. By: MARINUCCI, Marco (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); VERGOTE, Wouter (FacultŽs universitaires Saint-Louis, CEREC, B-1000 Bruxelles, Belgium and UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)
    Abstract: In a setting of R&D co-opetition we study, by using an all-pay auction approach, how collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences the possible collaboration network structures the firms can hope to form. The all pay auction approach allows us to 1) endogenize both network formation and R&D intensities and 2) take heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account. We find that, different from previous literature, the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable network, even and especially if the benefits from cooperating are important. Interestingly, the other possible stable networks all have the realistic property that some firms decide not to participate in the contest. Thus, weak cooperation through network formation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market for innovation. We further show that there need not be any network that survives a well known refinement of pairwise stability, strong stability, which imposes networks to be immune to coalitional deviations.
    Keywords: patent game, networks, R&D cooperation, all-pay auction
    JEL: L14 L24 O32
    Date: 2009–11–01
  3. By: Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the dynamics of R&D investments, and the structure of the seed distribution sector using novel data sets that have not been used before to describe competition in these industries. The results describe four sets of issues of particular importance. One is that while all agbiotechology firms have increased their R&D expenditures, there have been sharp differences in the scope of this spending. Most important is that this has spawned the growth in what is now referred as âseeds and traits.â Second, a large number of future traits will be commercialized in the coming years. A third set of results indicates that one firm grew its market share by 14% and a portion of this growth has been through acquisition. The other three majors lost market share, but the ISC (independent seed companies) grew by 10%. At the crop reporting district level, the industry concentration ratios for the four largest firms (CR4) in most regions are .5â.7. Finally, farmers purchased corn and soybean seed from 4â7 different companies in most crop reporting districts (CRD) and up to 20 or more companies in the larger producing regions.
    Keywords: Agbiotechnology, grain seeds, competition, Agribusiness, Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis,
    Date: 2010–02
  4. By: SHIMOMURA, Ken-Ichi (RIEB, Kobe University, Japan); THISSE, Jacques-Franois (UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain (UCL). Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
    Keywords: oligopoly, monopolistic competition, product differentiation, welfare
    JEL: L13 L40
    Date: 2009–08–01
  5. By: Dobbelaere, Sabien; Luttens, Roland Iwan; Peters, Bettina
    Keywords: investment under uncertainty, R&D, demand uncertainty, technical uncertainty, entry threat
    JEL: D21 D81 L12 O31
    Date: 2009–05–01
  6. By: Federico Etro; Michela Cella
    Abstract: We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities in the choice of incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivities. The equilibrium screening contracts require extra effort/investment from the most productive managers compared to the first best contracts: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no- distortion in the middle rather than at the top. Moreover, the equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types that are always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive re- lation between competition and high-powered incentives. An inverted-U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most pro- ductive managers, especially when entry is endogenous. These results persist when contracts are not observable, when they include quantity precommit- ments, and when products are imperfect substitutes.
    Keywords: Principal-agent contracts, asymmetric information, endogenous market structures
    JEL: D82 D L13
    Date: 2010–03

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