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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Jos Jansen (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In equilibrium at most one firm shares some of its technologies. For similar technology distributions, there exists an equilibrium in which nobody shares. If the technology distributions are skewed towards efficient technologies, then there may exist equilibria in which one firm shares all technologies, only the best technologies, or only intermediate technologies. No other equilibria can exist. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, strategic disclosure, trade secret, Cournot duopoly, indivisibility, open source, skewed distribution |
| JEL: | D82 L13 O32 O34 L17 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_36&r=tid |
| By: | Marion Frenz; Martha Prevezer |
| Abstract: | This paper brings together ideas about technological regimes and looks at their influence on patterns of sustained or persistent innovation across UK manufacturing and services industries using two waves of the UK Community Innovation Surveys. It builds a link between technological regimes and Schumpeterian patterns of innovation, and tests these on the CIS databases. It creates a model using the variables within the technological regime to see whether these can explain sustained patterns of innovation. These variables include appropriability, cumulativeness, technological opportunity and closeness to the science base as well as enterprise size. The paper finds that strong appropriability, a high degree of cumulativeness, and closeness to the applied science base are strong predictors of sustained innovation activities. The results on technological opportunity are ambiguous. High tech manufacturing industries, i.e. chemicals and scientific instruments as well as some high tech services i.e. telecoms are more likely to register persistent innovation. |
| Date: | 2010–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgs:wpaper:33&r=tid |
| By: | Jessica C. Stahl |
| Abstract: | An extensive literature has investigated the effect of market structure on innovation. A persistent concern is that market structure may be endogenous to innovation. Firms may choose to merge so as to capture information spillovers or they may choose to merge so as to dampen competition in innovation. These two scenarios have very different welfare implications. This paper attempts to distinguish between the two scenarios empirically, looking at recent mergers among public companies in the United States. Using patent citation data, I find evidence that firms increase their rate of sequential innovation in the years preceding a merger, and reduce their rate of sequential innovation in the years following a merger. This suggests that mergers are motivated more by the desire to dampen competition than by the desire to capture information spillovers. I use citation-based measures of patent value to shed light on the welfare implications. The question is relevant for policy, as the FTC and DOJ frequently cite innovation as a reason for concern about a merger. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2010-12&r=tid |