nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2009‒12‒19
four papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. The Dynamics of R&D Network in the IT Industry By Nobuyuki Hanaki; Ryo Nakajima; Yoshiaki Ogura
  2. Strategic Under-utilization of Patents and Entry Deterrence: The Case of Pharmaceutical Industry By Marjit, Sugata; Kabiraj, Tarun; Dutta, Arijita
  3. The design paradox: the contribution of in-house and external design activities on product market performance By Czarnitzki , Dirk; Thorwarth, Susanne
  4. Innovation, Fast Seconds, and Patent Policy By George Norman; Lynn Pepall; Dan Richards

  1. By: Nobuyuki Hanaki; Ryo Nakajima; Yoshiaki Ogura
    Abstract: In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of evolving networks of successful R&D collaborations in the IT industry (consisting of firms that obtained patents in the technological category of computers and communication) in the U.S. between 1985 and 1995. We first show that the R&D network has become more extensive, more clustered, and more unequal in the sense that 'stars' have emerged in the network. We then analyze the effect of the existing network structure in the process of new R&D collaboration formation. We control for unobserved similarities among firms based on the community structures within the network that the algorithm developed by Girvan and Newman (2004) identifies and find a significant cyclic closure and preferential attachment effect.
    Date: 2009–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tsu:tewpjp:2009-014&r=tid
  2. By: Marjit, Sugata; Kabiraj, Tarun; Dutta, Arijita
    Abstract: This paper seeks to explain why some pharmaceutical companies are observed to withdraw their products before patents are expired and simultaneously introduce new patented (competing) products. Given the specific nature of drug markets, the companies in fact increase the entry cost of the potential generic drug manufacturers and thereby lessen competition for new drugs. The paper determines the optimal date of withdrawing the product and studies comparative static effects of the change of parameters underlying the model.
    Keywords: Patent protection; patent expiry; pharmaceutical industries; generic drugs; entry cost.
    JEL: O3 L1
    Date: 2009–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:19157&r=tid
  3. By: Czarnitzki , Dirk; Thorwarth, Susanne
    Abstract: This paper explores the contribution of design activities on product market performance of Belgian companies. While there is mounting evidence that design can be seen as a strategic tool to successfully spur sales of new product developments at the firm level, the topic of design innovation has not been linked to the open innovation concept yet. In this paper we empirically test whether design activities conducted in-house differ in their contribution to new product sales from externally acquired design. Using a large crosssection of manufacturing and service firms, we investigate the effects on sales of products new to the market and of imitation or significantly improved products of the firm. At first glance, we find the paradox that externally acquired design is not superior to in-house design activities. This effect is robust to several modifications of the model specification. As earlier literature on new technological developments in high-tech sectors, we argue, however, that external design may not affect the sales of market novelties as the “market news” may spill-over quickly to rivals through common customers and suppliers including external designers. --
    Keywords: Design,R&D,Collaboration,Open Innovation,Product Market Performance
    JEL: O31 O32
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09068&r=tid
  4. By: George Norman; Lynn Pepall; Dan Richards
    Abstract: We develop a model of innovation in which entrepreneurs develop a new (differentiated) product market that is subsequently exploited by a well-established firm that "stretches" its brand to enter a new market as "fast second". In this setting, there is a positive externality to the pioneering efforts of the intitial entrants that may well increase with the number of such entrants. We develop a model that exhibits this externality and use it to evaluate the design of patent policy--specifically patent breadth--with a view to encouraging the optimal amount of initial entry.
    Keywords: fast second, product differentiation, contestability
    JEL: L5 O25
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0745&r=tid

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