nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2009‒07‒28
five papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Innovation and productivity in SMEs. Empirical evidence for Italy By Bronwyn H. Hall; Francesca Lotti; Jacques Mairesse
  2. First mover advantage in a dynamic duopoly with spillover By Gianluca Femminis; Gianmaria Martini
  3. Innovative Sales, R&D and Total Innovation Expenditures: Panel Evidence on their Dynamics By Raymond Wladimir; Mohnen Pierre; Palm Franz; Schim van der Loeff Sybrand
  4. Competition, imitation, and technical change : quality vs. variety By Cusolito, Ana
  5. Endogenous Technology Sharing in R&D Intensive Industries By Clark, Derek J.; Sand, Jan Yngve

  1. By: Bronwyn H. Hall (Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley); Francesca Lotti (Bank of Italy); Jacques Mairesse (CREST (ENSAE, Paris))
    Abstract: Innovation in SMEs exhibits some peculiar features that most traditional indicators of innovation activity do not capture. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a structural model of innovation which incorporates information on innovation success from firm surveys along with the usual R&D expenditures and productivity measures. We then apply the model to data on Italian SMEs from the “Survey on Manufacturing Firms” conducted by Mediocredito-Capitalia covering the period 1995-2003. The model is estimated in steps, following the logic of firms’ decisions and outcomes. We find that international competition fosters R&D intensity, especially for high-tech firms. Firm size, R&D intensity, along with investment in equipment enhances the likelihood of having both process and product innovation. Both these kinds of innovation have a positive impact on firm’s productivity, especially process innovation. Among SMEs, larger and older firms seem to be less productive.
    Keywords: R&D, innovation, productivity, SMEs, Italy
    JEL: L60 O31 O33
    Date: 2009–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_718_09&r=tid
  2. By: Gianluca Femminis (DISCE, Università Cattolica); Gianmaria Martini (Università di Bergamo)
    Abstract: We present a dynamic duopoly model of technical innovation where R&D costs decrease exogenously with time, and inter-firm knowledge spillover lowers the second comer's R&D cost. The spillover effect only becomes available after a disclosure lag. These features allow us to identify a new type of equilibrium: the leader delays investment until the R&D cost is low enough that the follower finds it optimal to invest as soon as he can benefit from the spillover. This equilibrium is subgame perfect over a wide range of parameters, and raises several interesting implications. First, in our new equilibrium the time delay between the two R&D investments is realistically short. Second, while the presence of a spillover favors the second mover, this benefit is not enough to rule out a first mover advantage. Indeed, the first mover advantage survives whenever technical progress is sufficiently fast and the disclosure lag is relatively long. Third, in case of a major innovation our equilibrium implies under--investment, which requires a substantial public intervention in favour of the investment activity.
    Keywords: R&D, knowledge spillover, dynamic oligopoly
    JEL: L13 L41 O33
    Date: 2009–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie6:itemq0955&r=tid
  3. By: Raymond Wladimir; Mohnen Pierre; Palm Franz; Schim van der Loeff Sybrand (METEOR)
    Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic relationship between input and output of innovation inDutch manufacturing using an unbalanced panel of enterprise data from five waves of the Community Innovation Survey during 1994-2004. We estimate by maximum likelihood a dynamic panel data bivariate tobit with double-index sample selection accounting for individual effects.We find persistence of innovation input and innovation output, a lag effect of the former onthe latter and a feedback effect of the latter on the former. The lag effect remains significantin the high-tech sector even after four years. Firm and industry effects are also important.
    Keywords: Economics (Jel: A)
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2009030&r=tid
  4. By: Cusolito, Ana
    Abstract: Some researchers have documented that the path of development is remarkably related to the pattern of sectoral diversification. Others have highlighted the relation between productive specialization and economic progress. This paper explores the role of product market competition and intellectual property rights protection in the pattern of sectoral diversification. The paper confirms the insight of the innovation literature, that competition induces firms to specialize and upgrade the quality of existing goods. However, it reveals a new force, called the imitation effect, through which competition biases technical change toward product diversification. The paper shows that if knowledge spillovers increase with imitation, or the degree of product substitution is high, weak protection of property rights encourages firms to create low-quality goods, thereby directing technical change toward diversification. The predictions are tested with data on Italian firms'innovation activity. They are found to be consistent with observed behavior.
    Keywords: Education for Development (superceded),Economic Theory&Research,E-Business,Markets and Market Access,Labor Policies
    Date: 2009–07–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4997&r=tid
  5. By: Clark, Derek J.; Sand, Jan Yngve
    Abstract: This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We show that the equilibrium coalition outcome is either one between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the three-firm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of anti-trust issues as an addition to the theory.
    Keywords: R&D, endogenous coalitions, asymmetric firms
    JEL: L11 L13
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:7592&r=tid

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