nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2009‒06‒10
four papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. The Organization of the Innovation Industry: Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists and Oligopolists By Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars
  2. Patent Disclosure and R&D Competition in Pharmaceuticals. By Laura Magazzini; Fabio Pammolli; Massimo Riccaboni; Maria Alessandra Rossi
  3. A structural model of establishment and industry evolution : evidence from Chile By Seker, Murat
  4. Network-independent partner selection and the evolution of innovation networks By Baum, Joel; Cowan, Robin; Jonard, Nicolas

  1. By: Norbäck, Pehr-Johan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Persson, Lars (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))
    Abstract: We construct a model where incumbents can either acquire basic innovations from entrepreneurs, or wait and acquire developed innovations from entrepreneurial firms supported by venture capitalists. We show that venture-backed entrepreneurial firms have an incentive to overinvest in development vis à vis incumbents due to strategic product market effects on the sales price of a developed innovation. This will trigger preemptive acquisitions by incumbents, thus increasing the reward for entrepreneurial innovations. We also show that venture capital can emerge in equilibrium if venture capitalists have cost advantages, or if development is associated with double moral hazard problems.
    Keywords: Acquisitions; Entrepreneurship; Innovation; Venture Capital
    JEL: G24 L10 L20 M13 O30
    Date: 2009–01–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0783&r=tid
  2. By: Laura Magazzini; Fabio Pammolli; Massimo Riccaboni; Maria Alessandra Rossi
    Abstract: The prominent role played by patents within the pharmaceutical domain is unquestionable. In this paper we take an unusual perspective and focus on a relatively neglected implication of patents: the effect of patent-induced information disclosure (of both successes and failures) on the dynamics of R&D and market competition. The study builds upon the combination of two large datasets, linking the information about patents to firm level data on R&D projects and their outcome. Two case studies in the fields of anti-inflammatory compounds and cancer research complement our analysis. We show the important role played by patent disclosure in shaping firms technological trajectories through the possibility of reciprocal monitoring in a context of parallel research efforts, and suggest the importance of enhancing the diffusion of information concerning failures, not only to avoid wasteful duplication of innovative efforts, but also as a tool for the identification of promising research trajectories. This paper is the result of the "R&D competition" research project carried out jointly with Adrian Towse and Martina Garau of the Office of Health Economics, London, UK. A preliminary draft of the paper has been presented to the DRUID Summer Conference 2006 (Copenhagen), and to the 11th ISS Conference (Sophia-Antipolis).
    Keywords: patent disclosure; innovation; r&d competition
    JEL: D23 D83 O34
    Date: 2009–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trt:disawp:0902&r=tid
  3. By: Seker, Murat
    Abstract: Many recent models have been developed to fit the basic facts on establishment and industry evolution. While these models yield a simple interpretation of the basic features of the data, they are too stylized to confront the micro-level data in a more formal quantitative analysis. In this paper, the author develops a model in which establishments grow by innovating new products. By introducing heterogeneity to a stylized industry evolution model, the analysis succeeds in explaining several features of the data, such as the thick right tail of the size distribution and the relations between age, size, and the hazard rate of exit, which had eluded existing models. In the model, heterogeneity in producer behavior arises through a combination of exogenous efficiency differences and accumulated innovations resulting from past endogenous research and development investments. Integrating these forces allows the model to perform well quantitatively in fitting data on Chilean manufacturers. The counterfactual experiments show how producers respond to research and development subsidies and more competitive market environments.
    Keywords: Water and Industry,Science Education,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Markets and Market Access,Industrial Management
    Date: 2009–06–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4947&r=tid
  4. By: Baum, Joel (Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto); Cowan, Robin (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University); Jonard, Nicolas (Universite du Luxembourg)
    Abstract: Empirical research on strategic alliances has focused on the idea that alliance partners are selected on the basis of social capital considerations. In this paper we emphasize instead the role of complementary knowledge stocks (broadly defined) in partner selection, arguing not only that knowledge complementarity should not be overlooked, but that is may be the true causal force behind alliance formation. To marshal evidence on this point, we design a simple model of partner selection in which firms ally for the purpose if learning and innovating, and in doing so create an industry network. We abstract completely from network-based structural and strategic motives for partner selection and focus instead on the idea that firms' knowledge bases must "fit" in order for joint learning and innovation to be possible, and thus for an alliance to be feasible. The striking result is what while containing no social capital considerations, the simple model replicates the firm conduct, network structure, and contingent effects of network position on performance observed and discussed in the empirical literature.
    Keywords: Network formation and dynamics, Innovation, Knowledge, Alliances
    JEL: D85 D24 L14 L24 O33
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2009022&r=tid

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