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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Bruno Amable (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Lilas Demmou (DGTPE - Direction Générale du Trésor et de la Politique Economique); Ivan Ledezma (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | According to a recent literature, the positive effect of competition is supposed to be growing with the proximity to the technological frontier. Using a variety of indicators, the paper tests the effect of competition and regulation on innovative activity measured by patenting. The sample consists of a panel of 15 industries for 17 OECD countries over the period 1979-2003. Results show no evidence of a positive effect of competition growing with the proximity to the frontier. Two main configurations emerge. First, regulation has a positive effect whatever the distance to the frontier and the magnitude of its impact is higher the closer the industry is to the frontier. Second, the effect of regulation is negative far from the frontier and becomes positive (or non significant) when the technology gap decreases. These results contradict the belief in the innovation-boosting effect of product market deregulation such as taken into account in the Lisbon Strategy. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, competition, distance to frontier. |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00340409_v1&r=tid |
| By: | Scholz, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | A government that wants to increase welfare by subsidizing either an industry’s sales or process innovations or both has to account for possible changes of production, when firms can foresee the government’s actions. In an optimal control framework welfare can be increased by subsidizing either an industry’s sales or process innovations. An earlier innovation date increases the price that is charged up to that innovation date, but decreases it afterwards, when process innovation costs depend on the date of innovation. Hence the welfare effect might be negative. This paper will be the first that sets up a framework, which helps to examine the optimal mixture of sales and innovation subsidies, where innovation costs depend on time and learning on cumulative production quantities. The process innovation can be understood as a substitute to learning. In this set up innovation subsidies are more beneficial for the monopolist, sales subsidies for consumers. |
| Keywords: | Process Innovation; Timing; Learning-by-Doing |
| JEL: | L11 L51 O30 |
| Date: | 2008–10–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:7575&r=tid |