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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Massón-Guerra, José Luis; Vendrell-Ferrero, Ferran |
| Abstract: | Whereas the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship focuses on the diffusion of innovative output and knowledge filter among new firms and industries (Acts, et al., 2005; Audrescht, 2007), it has not been studied the phenomenon of entrepreneurship dissemination or entrepreneurship spillover among sectors. From an adaptation of the model of input-output matrix (Leontief, 1936; Dietzenbacher and Los, 2002) we develop a methodology that allows calculating the concept of entrepreneurship spillover. Besides, using intra-sectorial data from the 73 Spanish sectors, we empirically test the characteristics of the sectors with more entrepreneurship spillover. In short, the results clearly state that higher diversity and competition entails more entrepreneurship spillover. Moreover, the innovation only affects positively entrepreneurship spillover in restricted situations, briefly when the sectors have high competition and/or a high degree of technology. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship; Innovation; Economic Growth; Multipliers; Leontief; Input Output Analysis; |
| JEL: | O30 L26 O4 C67 |
| Date: | 2008–09–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:10748&r=tid |
| By: | Rafael Boix Domenech (Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autonoma de) |
| Abstract: | The I-district effect hypothesis establishes the existence of highly intense innovation in Marshallian industrial districts due to the presence of external localization economies. However, industrial districts are characterized by specific manufacturing specializations in such a way that this effect could be due to these dominant specializations. The objective of this research is to test whether the effect is explained by the conditions of the territory or by the industrial specialization and to provide additional evidence of the existence and causes of the highly intense innovation in industrial districts (I-district effect). The estimates for Spain of a fixed effects model interacting territory and industry suggest that the high innovative performance of industrial districts is maintained across sectors whereas the industrial specialization behaves differently depending on the type of local production system in which it is placed. The I-district effect is related to the conditions of the territory more than to the industrial specialization. The territory is a key variable in explaining the processes of innovation and should be considered a basic dimension in the design of innovation and industrial policies. |
| Keywords: | industrial districts, innovation, external economies, district effect |
| JEL: | O14 O31 R12 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea0807&r=tid |
| By: | Gianluca Femminis (DISCE, Università Cattolica); Gianmaria Martini (Università di Bergamo) |
| Abstract: | In our duopoly, an irreversible investment incorporates a significant amount of R&D, so that the improvement it introduces in production processes generates a spillover lowering the second comer's investment cost. The presence of the inter-firm spillover substantially affects the equilibrium of the dynamic game: for low -- and hence realistic -- spillover values, the leader delays her investment until the stochastic fundamental has reached a level such that the follower's optimal strategy is to invest as soon as he attains the spillover. This bears several interesting implications. First, because the follower invests upon benefiting from the spillover, in our equilibrium the average time delay between the two investments is short, which is realistic. Second, we show that in case of a major innovation, an optimal public policy requires a substantial intervention in favour of the investment activity; moreover, an increase in uncertainty -- delaying the equilibrium -- calls for higher subsidization rates. Third, we find, by means of numerical simulations, that the spillover reduces the difference in the leader's and in the follower's maximum value function. Accordingly, our model can help generating realistic market betas. |
| Keywords: | irreversible investment, knowledge spillover, dynamic oligopoly |
| JEL: | C73 L13 O33 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctc:serie6:itemq0850&r=tid |
| By: | Ramón Faulí-Oller (Universidad de Alicante); Joel Sandonís (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we get the optimal two-part tariff contract for the licensing of a cost reducing innovation to a differentiated goods industry of a general size. We analyze the cases where the patentee is an independent laboratory or an incumbent firm. We show that, regardless of the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation and the type of patentee, the innovation is licensed to all firms. Moreover, we endogenize R&D investment and get that an internal patentee invests more (less) in R&D when the technological opportunity is low (high). In this paper we get the optimal two-part tariff contract for the licensing of a cost reducing innovation to a differentiated goods industry of a general size. We analyze the cases where the patentee is an independent laboratory or an incumbent firm. We show that, regardless of the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation and the type of patentee, the innovation is licensed to all firms. Moreover, we endogenize R&D investment and get that an internal patentee invests more (less) in R&D when the technological opportunity is low (high). |
| Keywords: | patent licensing, two-part tariff contracts, R&D, product differentiation. |
| JEL: | L11 L13 L14 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2008-12&r=tid |