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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
By: | Vargas Barrenechea, Martin |
Abstract: | In this work we study licensing games of non drastic innovations under the shadow of probabilistic patents. We study the situation of a insider innovator that get a new reduction cost innovation and acts in a duopoly market under Cournout competition. When the property rights are not ironclad the potential licensee additional to the option of use the backstop technology instead of the new technology ,has the option of infringe the patent. Under infringement the patent holder can sue the infringer in a court and if its successful could get a order of damages payment. Then when the infringer decides about what kind of technology to use the infringement is always better than to use the backstop technology then a difference of the ironclad licensing games probabilistic rights, change the threats points and makes attractive for the patent holder just to license big innovations under the Lost Profit rule. |
Keywords: | Patents; innovation economics; probabilistic property rights; damage rules |
JEL: | L0 K42 C72 |
Date: | 2008–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:9925&r=tid |
By: | Lukas Lengauer; Eva Nussmüller; Michaela Trippl; Franz Tödtling |
Date: | 2008 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwsre:sre-disc-2008_04&r=tid |
By: | Sherrill Shaffer; Iftekhar Hasan; Mingming Zhou |
Abstract: | Using data from metropolitan U.S. labor market areas, we quantify empirical associations between entry by small firms and a vector of economic performance measures encompassing levels, volatilities, and growth rates of several income and employment variables. Distinct and robust associations are found for net and gross rates of entry. These results suggest a richer variety of effects of entry in metropolitan markets than previously documented, and point to several potential tradeoffs associated with entry by small firms. |
JEL: | O1 J23 M13 |
Date: | 2008–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:camaaa:2008-24&r=tid |