nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2007‒06‒18
seven papers chosen by
Rui Baptista
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Breadth and Depth of Main Technology Fields: An empirical investigation using patent data By Muge Ozman
  2. Intellectual Property Rights and Crop-Improving R&D under Adaptive Destruction By Oleg Yerokhin; GianCarlo Moschini
  3. The Foundations of the Economics of Innovation By Antonelli Cristiano
  4. The Effects of Stronger Intellectual Property Rights on Technology Transfer: Evidence from Japanese Firm-level Data By Ryuhei Wakasugi; Banri Ito
  5. Techonology Based Strategic Alliances: A Turkish Perspective By Akkaya, Cenk
  6. DRMs, Innovation and Creation By BOMSEL, Olivier; GEFFROY, Anne-Gaëlle
  7. Innovation, Investment and Regulation: What are the Options for Regulation in the Near Future? By FLACHER, David; JENNEQUIN, Hugues; LORENZI, Jean-Hervé

  1. By: Muge Ozman (Science and Technology Policies Research Centre)
    Abstract: Recently work on technological change has emphasized the importance and implications of different knowledge bases among industries in terms of innovative potential. In some industries, products and processes have become more complex, as well as there appears to be increased convergence in some market segments. Although increasing attention has been given to features of knowledge bases, there have been limited empirical research on how to measure them. In this paper a method is proposed to measure empirically the breadth and depth dimensions of main technology fields, sectors and firms in the economy. For this purpose, we measure the knowledge bases of 30 main technology fields by using the concepts of breadth and depth. Breadth corresponds to the range of different subjects that a technology field draws upon. Depth refers to the extent to which a certain field is exploited in detail. We position the main technology fields in the breadth and depth space by utilizing the EPO (European Patent Office) database between 1978-2000. We also present the evolution of breadth and depth through time, as well as the breadth and depth dimensions of 40 largest firms in biotechnology and telecommunications. Our results reveal that the both technology fields and firms are largely scattered in the breadth and depth space. Biotechnology stands out to have the highest breadth and depth.
    Keywords: Patents, Breadth and depth, technology fields, knowledge base.
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:met:stpswp:0701&r=tid
  2. By: Oleg Yerokhin; GianCarlo Moschini (Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD))
    Abstract: This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a "research exemption" provision. The study of the welfare function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions, and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.
    Keywords: biological resistance, intellectual property rights, Markov perfect equilibrium, patents, research exemption, R&D, sequential innovation. JEL Classification: L00, O31, O34, Q28
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ias:cpaper:07-wp449&r=tid
  3. By: Antonelli Cristiano (University of Turin)
    Date: 2007–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:200702&r=tid
  4. By: Ryuhei Wakasugi (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University); Banri Ito (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry)
    Abstract: It is noteworthy that intra-firm technology transfer has grown rapidly in recent years as a major part of international technology transfer. This paper presents empirical analysis of the effect of stronger Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) on technology transfer from parent firm to its subsidiaries in foreign country. The results of empirical test, based on the firm-level panel data of Japanese MNCsf foreign subsidiaries, present that the stronger protection of IPRs has a positive effect on the promotion of intra-firm technology transfer after controlling market specific factors in the host countries as well as parent-subsidiary firm specific factors. They are consistent with our theoretical prediction and also the results of the previous studies based on US firm-level data.
    Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Technology Transfer, Multinational Firms, FDI
    JEL: C23 F20 F23 O30 O3
    Date: 2007–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:632&r=tid
  5. By: Akkaya, Cenk
    Abstract: Strategic alliances can be as simple as two companies sharing their technological and/or marketing resources. In this context, strategic alliances help firms in an entrepreneurial way by allowing them to reorganize their value chain activities more effectively. Business alliances can assist organizations to acquire the means to compete within an ever complex and changing environment and it provide firms with market knowledge, open up access to know-how and technology. This study focuses on the technology related alliances from 2002 to 2005 in Turkey.
    Keywords: Strategic Alliances; Techology Based Alliances; Compatitive Power
    JEL: O32 O3
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3479&r=tid
  6. By: BOMSEL, Olivier; GEFFROY, Anne-Gaëlle
    Abstract: DRMs are intellectual property institutions. They transpose the empirical principle of copyright, which implicitly recognizes that specific ownership rules should be attached to non scientific creation, into the digital era. The legal protection of DRMs, a private means of enforcing content excludability, participates in the "privatization" of copyright protection. This, in turn, means that a proprietary software — governed by intellectual property rights, reinforced by public law — becomes the key to the vertical relations shaped by exclusive copyright. DRMs consequently represent a major stake in the competition to capture network effects in the content distribution vertical chain
    Keywords: copyright; distribution; DRMs; network effects
    JEL: D43 D62 L96 K21
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3515&r=tid
  7. By: FLACHER, David; JENNEQUIN, Hugues; LORENZI, Jean-Hervé
    Abstract: This paper addresses the question of what options are available to regulate the sector in the near future. In order to answer this question, the paper focuses on the problem of investment and innovation in an ex ante regulated sector. Relying on existing literature, we argue that ex ante regulation could represent a danger for the long-term development of the sector by delaying or cancelling investment projects, especially (but not only) concerning the construction of new infrastructures. We also argue that ex ante regulation is distorting investment itself: incremental investment is privileged as opposed to radical investment. In this context, we identify three possible options for regulation in the near future: 1) continuing ex ante regulation, 2) substituting ex post regulation for ex ante regulation and 3) implementing an industrial policy for macro-strategic reasons. After describing a few major mutations in the sector that must be taken into account by regulators and presenting the major dilemmas that the latter are facing, we propose two possible solutions inspired by foreign policy. The first solution consists of offering investors regulation holidays, with regular reviews to deem whether these holidays should be prolonged or not. The second solution consists of implementing an industrial policy that could take the form of a contract negotiated between the regulator and operators. This would guarantee the absence of ex ante regulation if the conditions of the contract (in terms of regional planning, price, quality of service, types of investment…) are met.
    Keywords: regulation; innovation; investment and industrial policy.
    JEL: L50 L52 L41 L51 D43 K23 L96 L43
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:3573&r=tid

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