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on Technology and Industrial Dynamics |
| By: | Franco Malerba (Cespri, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy.); Richard Nelson (Columbia University, New York, USA.); Luigi Orsenigo (University of Brescia and CESPRI, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.); Sidney Winter (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA.) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we present a history-friendly model of the changing vertical scope of computer firms during the evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries. The model is “history friendly”, in that it attempts at replicating some basic, stylized qualitative features of the evolution of vertical integration on the basis of the causal mechanisms and processes which we believe can explain the history. The specific question addressed in the model is set in the context of dynamic and uncertain technological and market environments, characterized by periods of technological revolutions punctuating periods of relative technological stability and smooth technical progress. The model illustrates how the patterns of vertical integration and specialization in the computer industry change as a function of the evolving levels and distribution of firms’ capabilities over time and how they depend on the co-evolution of the upstream and downstream sectors. Specific conditions in each of these markets – the size of the external market, the magnitude of the technological discontinuities, the lock-in effects in demand – exert critical effects and feedbacks on market structure and on the vertical scope of firms as time goes by. |
| Keywords: | Industrial Dynamics, Vertical Integration, Specialization, Technology. |
| JEL: | O30 L10 L60 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp191&r=tid |
| By: | Audretsch, David B; Sanders, Mark |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that globalization has led to a shift in developed countries from an industrial to an entrepreneurial model of production. Globalization is interpreted as a level shock in the supply of unskilled labor to the world economy, a decrease in the level of political risk associated with outward foreign direct investment (offshoring), and the widespread diffusion of a general purpose technology such as ICT. The impact of these exogenous shocks is then analyzed in a variety expansion model that distinguishes among three types of varieties. Following the life cycle we distinguish among new, mature and offshore production. The above shocks all result in a shift in comparative advantage in developed countries towards new varieties which correspond to the early stage of the product life cycle. Moreover, because entrepreneurs serve as agents that move varieties between life cycle stages, their importance increases due to globalization. The many new opportunities for profit benefit entrepreneurs and skilled labour. By contrast, factors of production employed in the mature stages of the life cycle become less important. Thus, the model explains the emergence of what we label an entrepreneurial economy. |
| Keywords: | entrepreneurship; globalization |
| JEL: | F01 J31 O1 P0 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6247&r=tid |
| By: | Vianney Dequiedt (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - [INRA]); Bruno Versaevel (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]) |
| Abstract: | Patent pools are cooperative agreements between several patent owners to bundle the sale of their respective licenses. In this paper we analyze their consequences on the speed of the innovation process. We adopt an ex ante perspective and study the impact of possible pool formation on the incentives to innovate. Because participation in the creation of a pool acts as a bonus reward on R&D activity, we show that a firm's investment pattern is upward sloping over time before pool formation. The smaller the set of initial contributors, the higher this effect. A pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and acceptance/refusal by the competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations. It also leads a forward looking regulator to delay the clearance date of the pool. This may result in a pool size that is suboptimal from an ex ante viewpoint. |
| Keywords: | competition policy ; licensing ; R&D races ; research and development |
| Date: | 2007–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00142497_v1&r=tid |