nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2005‒09‒02
five papers chosen by
Roberto Fontana
Universita Bocconi

  1. WHY SO MANY LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS? By Claudio Michelacci; Olmo Silva
  2. Perfectly Competitive Innovation By Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
  3. Tying and entry deterrence in vertically differentiated markets By Eugen Kovac
  4. The Effects of the Exchange Rate on Investment: Evidence from Canadian Manufacturing Industries By Tarek Harchaoui; Faouzi Tarkhani; Terence Yuen
  5. Fusiones y adquisiciones en mercados con empresas públicas y privadas By Germán Coloma

  1. By: Claudio Michelacci; Olmo Silva (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)
    Abstract: We document that the fraction of entrepreneurs who work in the region where they were born is significantly higher than the corresponding fraction for dependent workers. This difference is more pronounced in more developed regions and positively related to the degree of local financial development. Frims created by locals are more valuable and bigger (in terms of capital and employment), operate with more capital intensive technologies, and are able to obtain greater financing per unit of capital invested, than firms created by non-locals. This evidence suggests that there are so many local entrepreneurs because locals can better exploit the financial opportunities available in the region where they were born. This can help explaining how local financial development cause presistent disparities in entrepreneurial activity, technology, and income.
    Keywords: Entreprenurship, economic and financial development, social capital.
    JEL: J23 O12 O16 Z13
    Date: 2005–05
  2. By: Michele Boldrin; David K Levine
    Date: 2005–08–28
  3. By: Eugen Kovac
    Abstract: This paper analyzes tying and bundling as an entry deterrence tool. It shows that a multi-product firm can defend its monopoly position in one market via tying even when it does not have market power in another market. This is shown on a model with two complementary goods, each of which is vertically differentiated and in which consumers’ preferences for the goods are positively correlated. Some possible ways of defending against entry deterrence, and implications for competition policy, are discussed.
    Keywords: Industrial organization, vertical differentiation, anti-trust policy, entry deterrence, foreclosure, tying, bundling.
    JEL: L11 L12 L13 L41
    Date: 2005–08
  4. By: Tarek Harchaoui; Faouzi Tarkhani; Terence Yuen
    Abstract: Using industry-level data for 22 Canadian manufacturing industries, the authors examine the relationship between exchange rates and investment during the period 1981-97. Their empirical results show that the overall effect of exchange rates on total investment is statistically insignificant. Further investigation reveals the non-uniform investment response to exchange rate movements in three channels. First, it is important to distinguish between environments that have low and high exchange rate volatilities. Through changes in output demands, depreciations would have a positive effect on total investment when the exchange rate volatility is low. Yet, this stimulative effect becomes considerably smaller as the volatility increases. Second, these results for total investment are mainly due to movements in other machinery and equipment, and not to investment in information technology and structures. Third, investment in industries with low markup ratios are more likely to be affected by exchange rate movements.
    Keywords: Exchange rates; Domestic demand and components
    JEL: F4 D24
    Date: 2005
  5. By: Germán Coloma
    Abstract: This paper develops an oligopoly model with firms that may potentially be public or private, and solves it for different cases in which the number and ownership of those firms vary. The results are then compared in terms of total surplus and consumer surplus, and this comparison produces implications for the antitrust appraisal of possible mergers and acquisitions. It follows that certain types of mergers are unambiguously favorable or unfavorable from the point of view of their contribution to both total and consumer surplus, while others may be convenient in one of those dimensions but inconvenient in the other dimension.
    JEL: D43 L33 L44
    Date: 2005–08

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