nep-tid New Economics Papers
on Technology and Industrial Dynamics
Issue of 2005‒06‒27
six papers chosen by
Francesco Lissoni
Universita degli Studi di Brescia

  1. Economics: the next physical science? By J. Doyne Farmer; Martin Shubik; Eric Smith
  2. R&D Networks with Heterogenous Firms By Lorenzo Zirulia
  3. The Scientific Productivity of Academic Inventors: New Evidence From Italian Data By Stefano Breschi; Francesco Lissoni; Fabio Montobbio
  4. If Star Scientists do not Patent: an Event History Analysis of Scientific Eminence and the Decision to Patent in the Academic World By Mario Calderini; Chiara Franzoni; Andrea Vezzulli
  5. Culture's Influence on innovation adoption : A global study of manager's adoption intention of telecom innovations By Frambach, Ruud T.; Herk, Hester van; Agarwal, Manoj K.
  6. They Don't Invent Them Like They Used To: An Examination of Energy Patent Citations Over Time By David Popp

  1. By: J. Doyne Farmer; Martin Shubik (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Eric Smith
    Abstract: We review an emerging body of work by physicists addressing questions of economic organization and function. We suggest that, beyond simply employing models familiar from physics to economic observables, remarkable regularities in economic data may suggest parts of social order that can usefully be incorporated into, and in turn can broaden, the conceptual structure of physics.
    Keywords: Economic theory, Physics, Econo-physics
    JEL: B49 C00 G00
    Date: 2005–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1520&r=tid
  2. By: Lorenzo Zirulia (CESPRI, Università Bocconi, Milano)
    Abstract: This paper models the formation of R&D networks in an industry where firms are technologically heterogenous, extending previous work by Goyal and Moraga (2001). While remaining competitors in the market side, firms share their R&D efforts on a pairwise base, to an extent that depends on their technological capabilities. First, we consider a four firms’ industry. In the class of symmetric networks, the complete network is the only pairwise stable network, although not necessarily profit or social welfare maximizing. Then, we extend the analysis to asymmetric structures in a three firms’ industry. Only the complete and the partially connected networks are possibly stable, but which network is stable depends on the level of heterogeneity and technological opportunities. The complete and partially connected networks are also the possible welfare and aggregate profit maximizing networks, but social and private incentives do not generally coincide. Finally, we consider the notion of strongly stable networks, where all the possible deviations by coalitions of agents are allowed. It turns out that in the four firms’ case, the complete network is very rarely strongly stable, while in the three firms’ case the partially connected network where two firms in different technological group are linked is, for a large subset of the parameter space, the only strongly stable network.
    Keywords: Strategic alliances; Networks; Research and development; Technological complementarities
    JEL: D21 D43
    Date: 2005–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp167&r=tid
  3. By: Stefano Breschi (CESPRI, Università Bocconi, Milano); Francesco Lissoni (CESPRI, Università Bocconi, Milano and University of Brescia, Italy); Fabio Montobbio (CESPRI, Università Bocconi, Milano and Università of Insubria, Varese, Italy)
    Abstract: We investigate the scientific productivity of Italian academic inventors, namely academic researchers designated as inventors on patent applications to the European Patent Office, 1978-1999. We use a new longitudinal data set comprising 299 academic inventors, and as many matching controls (non-patenting researchers). We enquire whether a trade-off between publishing and patenting, or a trade-off between basic and applied research exists, on the basis of the number and quality of publications. We find no trace of such a trade- off, and find instead a strong and positive relationship between patenting and publishing, even in basic science. Our results suggest however that it is not patenting per se that boosts scientific productivity, but the advantage derived from solid links with industry, as the strongest correlation between publishing and patenting activity is found when patents are owned by business partners, rather than individual scientists or their universities.
    Keywords: Scientific productivity; Academic inventors; University patenting
    JEL: O34 O31
    Date: 2005–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp168&r=tid
  4. By: Mario Calderini (DSPEA, Polytechnic of Turin, Italy); Chiara Franzoni (University of Bergamo and CERIS (CNR), Italy); Andrea Vezzulli (Department of Economics, University of Milan, Italy)
    Abstract: This paper contributes to the debate upon the trade-off between science and technology by looking at how the scientific performances of a researcher relate ex-ante to his/her attitude to patent, during his/her academic career. We run an event history analysis explaining the hazard for a scientist to become the inventor of a private-company -assigned patent as depending on publications and on personal, institutional and environmental characteristics. A striking result is that, although either productivity or quality, independently taken, are likely to increase the hazard to patent, top performers scientists, i.e. those scientists that publish a lot on highly-rated journals, are at very low risk.
    Keywords: Academic patenting; Research funding; Technology transfer
    JEL: O31 O34 O38
    Date: 2005–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp169&r=tid
  5. By: Frambach, Ruud T. (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Econometrie (Free University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics Sciences, Business Administration and Economitrics); Herk, Hester van; Agarwal, Manoj K.
    Abstract: Diffusion patterns of products are known to differ significantly between countrie. Studies that mainly focused on consumer contexts in European countries show that culture has a significant effect on innovation diffusion and consumer innovativeness. In the present research we focus on adoption intentions of individual managers operating in a business-to-business context, for two telecommunication innovations. We expect rational motives to drive the adoption process more than national-cultural values. The study contains data from more than 3,200 respondents in 22 countries worldwide, including less developed countries. Results reveal that individual-level variables and economic characteristics of a country drive adoption more than national culture. Moreover, this effect seems stronger for the relatively newer and more expensive innovation.
    Keywords: international adoption; innovation; national culture; managers; worldwide survey
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:vuarem:2004-14&r=tid
  6. By: David Popp
    Abstract: This paper uses patent citation data to study flows of knowledge across time and across institutions in the field of energy research. Popp (2002) finds the level of energy-saving R&D depends not only on energy prices, but also on the quality of the accumulated knowledge available to inventors. Patent citations are used to represent this quality. This paper explores the pattern of citations in these fields more carefully. I find evidence for diminishing returns to research inputs, both across time and within a given year. To check whether government R&D can help alleviate potential diminishing returns, I pay special attention to citations to government patents. Government patents filed in or after 1981 are more likely to be cited. More importantly, descendants of these government patents are 30 percent more likely to be cited by subsequent patents. Earlier government research was more applied in nature and is not cited more frequently.
    JEL: O33 O38 Q40
    Date: 2005–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11415&r=tid

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