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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Fleming, Owen; Singh, Tejendra Pratap; Yusuff, Olanrewaju |
| Abstract: | Using multiple survey waves of the American Time Use Survey, we demonstrate that online sports betting legalization had spillover effects on how people spend their time on various activities. We show that time spent on leisurely activities increases postlegalization driven by an increase in time spent on consuming mass media and socialization. The heterogeneity analysis highlights that young male time reallocation is more pronounced. The estimates are robust to multiple empirical checks. |
| Date: | 2024–11–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:nxg6y |
| By: | Keefer, Quinn (California State University San Marcos); Kniesner, Thomas J. (Claremont Graduate University) |
| Abstract: | Our research interest is in the existence and size of possible peer effects in pay or whether a worker may get a higher salary because another worker does rather than being related to a change in the worker’s productivity or market forces. Previous research, which has concentrated on executive pay, suffers from the inability to control for labor market forces. We net out market forces by studying a group of particular U.S. pro football players who are subject to a tightly budgeted unionized institutional arrangement affecting certain players pay set in the offseason. Our empirical results for NFL wide-receivers and cornerbacks during 2013-2022 are that there is an elasticity of average contract value with respect to the largest contract already signed in the offseason of about 0.17. Players we study who sign the largest contract during the offseason at the time of signing generate significant pay spillovers to players signing subsequent offseason contracts, suggesting that their compensation is economically and statistically significantly impacted by peer group reference points. |
| Keywords: | labor market reference point effects, NFL player pay, fixed effects, quantile regression, influence analysis |
| JEL: | J31 J33 Z21 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17440 |
| By: | Dmitry Ryvkin; Qin Wu |
| Abstract: | We study the optimal allocation of prizes in rank-order tournaments with loss averse agents. Prize sharing becomes increasingly optimal with loss aversion because more equitable prizes reduce the marginal psychological cost of anticipated losses. Furthermore, loss aversion can boost effort if prizes are sufficiently equitable, but otherwise effort declines with loss aversion. Overall, these results give credence to more equitable allocations of competitive rewards. A win-win scenario is where optimal prizes are equitable even under loss neutrality, in which case the principal benefits from agents' loss aversion. |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2411.01068 |
| By: | Mehmet S. Ismail |
| Abstract: | In this note, I introduce Performance Rating Equilibrium (PRE) as a sequence of hypothetical ratings for each player, such that if these ratings were each player's initial rating at the start of a tournament, scoring the same points against the same opponents would leave each player's initial rating unchanged. In other words, each player's initial rating perfectly predicts their actual score in the tournament. However, this property does not hold for the well-known Tournament Performance Rating. PRE is a fixed point of a multidimensional 'rating' function. I show that such a fixed point, and hence a PRE, exists under mild conditions. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2410.19006 |