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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Andy Chung (Department of Economics, University of Reading); Tin Cheuk Leung (Wake Forest University); James Reade (Department of Economics, University of Reading) |
| Abstract: | Digital platforms expose workers and managers to immediate, public, and persistent evaluations from external audiences, creating a form of social pressure that may shape workplace decisions. We examine whether such digital social pressure predicts subsequent opportunity allocation and worker performance, using professional football as a high-frequency empirical setting. We link player-match data from Europe’s five major leagues to post-match Twitter commentary and construct measures of negative sentiment, toxicity, and racial abuse. Comparing players with themselves over time and teammates in the same current match, we find that greater negative sentiment is associated with a lower probability of appearing in the team’s next match. Toxicity shows a similar but less stable association, while racial-abuse intensity is imprecisely estimated when the measures enter jointly. By contrast, associations with performance conditional on a subsequent appearance are small and imprecise. Overall, the findings suggest that digital social pressure is reflected more strongly in the allocation of subsequent opportunities than in worker performance, showing how public evaluations generated outside formal organizational boundaries can become part of the reputational environment surrounding internal managerial decisions. |
| Keywords: | digital social pressure, online criticism, managerial decision-making, worker performance, social media, professional football, racial abuse |
| JEL: | J24 M54 D91 Z22 J71 |
| Date: | 2026–09–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2026-10 |
| By: | Martin Bichler; Abheek Ghosh |
| Abstract: | We study equilibrium computation in discrete multiplayer Colonel Blotto games with player-specific battlefield values. In the two-player model with common battlefield values, equilibria can be computed in polynomial time. We show that this tractability breaks down in the multiplayer model with player-specific values under the standard uniform tie-breaking rule. In particular, computing a $(c/n)$-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard for some constant $c>0$, even when every player has three resources, where $n$ is the number of players. The main technical step is PPAD-hardness for computing a constant-approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium. In contrast, under uniform tie-breaking, a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time when every player has one resource. We also prove PPAD membership for computing $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria for inverse-exponentially small $\varepsilon$. Finally, for non-uniform monotone tie-breaking, we show PPAD-hardness even when every player has one resource and all players have identical battlefield values. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.30019 |
| By: | Wolfgang Kuhle |
| Abstract: | We study coordination games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information about their adversary's preparations. Precise information enables agents to screen for cooperation, selecting the payoff-dominant equilibrium either via small exogenous trembles or via payoff uncertainty. Across scenarios, we emphasize that decomposing an action into (i) preparation and (ii) execution allows us to analyze simultaneous-move games where players partially observe each other's contemporaneous actions. |
| Date: | 2026–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2609.17608 |
| By: | Juergen Eichberger (Universitat Heidelberg); Simon Grant (Australian National University); David Kelsey (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We propose Consistent-Planning Equilibrium under Ambiguity (CP-EUA), a solution concept for two-player multi-stage games with almost perfect information. Players evaluate continuation payoffs using a neo-additive representation centred on a behavioural-strategy theory of the opponent. The additive component is identified with the opponent’s behavioural strategy, while the ambiguity component captures the player’s lack of confidence in that theory. The lack-of-confidence parameter is revised by Generalized Bayesian Updating (GBU). Players take account of possible changes in their future ambiguity-sensitive evaluations by using consistent planning. We show that, in the centipede game, ambiguity about the opponent’s strategic behaviour together with sufficient optimism can sustain cooperation for many periods. Similarly, in a non-cooperative bargaining game, ambiguity and optimism may generate delay before agreement is reached. |
| Keywords: | optimism; neo-additive beliefs; extensive-form games; dynamic consistency; consistent planning; centipede game; bargaining |
| Date: | 2026–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2026-07 |