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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Flintz, Joschka |
| Abstract: | This study examines the determinants of away fan attendance in Germany's top three football divisions over six seasons and assesses its impact on match outcomes. The analysis reveals that, after conditioning on home and away teams, distance and kick-off time are the most important predictors of away fan turnout. Moreover, away support is found to have a statistically significant positive effect on team performance: an additional 1, 000 away fans is associated with a 4.6% to 7.5% increase in the probability of the away team winning or drawing the match. These findings suggest that league organizers should consider fan logistics and the potential influence of away fan presence when scheduling fixtures, in order to maintain sporting equity. At the club level, the results underscore the value of fostering fan engagement and indicate that strategies aimed at increasing away attendance may contribute to improved sporting outcomes. |
| Abstract: | Diese Studie untersucht die Determinanten der Auswärtsfanbeteiligung in den drei höchsten deutschen Fußballligen über sechs Spielzeiten hinweg und bewertet deren Auswirkungen auf die Spielergebnisse. Die Analyse zeigt, dass nach Berücksichtigung der Heim- und Auswärtsmannschaften die Entfernung und die Anstoßzeit die wichtigsten Prädiktoren für die Auswärtsfanbeteiligung sind. Darüber hinaus hat die Unterstützung der Auswärtsfans einen statistisch signifikanten positiven Einfluss auf die Leistung der Mannschaft: 1.000 zusätzliche Auswärtsfans erhöhen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die Auswärtsmannschaft das Spiel gewinnt oder unentschieden spielt, um 4, 6 % bis 7, 5 %. Diese Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die Liga-Organisatoren bei der Spielplanerstellung die Logistik für die Fans und den potenziellen Einfluss der Anwesenheit von Auswärtsfans berücksichtigen sollten, um die sportliche Fairness zu wahren. Auf Vereinsebene unterstreichen die Ergebnisse den Wert der Förderung des Fanengagements und deuten darauf hin, dass Strategien zur Steigerung der Auswärtsbesucherzahlen zu besseren sportlichen Ergebnissen beitragen können. |
| Keywords: | Sport economics, Away fan attendance, Team performance, Spatio-temporal analysis |
| JEL: | C23 Z20 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:333895 |
| By: | Nils Braakmann (Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University); Andy (Department of Economics, University of Reading); J. James Reade (Department of Economics, University of Reading); Gennaro Rossi (Department of Economics, University of Reading) |
| Abstract: | While the relationship between football matches and crime has been well documented, little is known about whether such events also escalate violent interactions between police officers and civilians. This study addresses that gap by analysing use of force data from the Metropolitan Police Service in London to assess the impact of football matches on police behaviour. We find that on match days, the number of use of force incidents increases by an average of 0.772 in the boroughs where games are held. This effect is geographically concentrated around football stadium and is primarily driven by matches involving popular clubs, or those with violent fan bases. We find no evidence of spatial or temporal displacement of incidents. We also find some suggestive evidence that incidents may be more frequent in the case of unexpected losses. We make the case that despite the long-standing association between football and crime, the effects are considerably smaller compared to other popular mass events. |
| Keywords: | policing, football, stop and search, police use of force |
| JEL: | K42 H11 L83 |
| Date: | 2025–12–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2025-07 |
| By: | Cai, Qingyin; Li, Qingxiao |
| Keywords: | Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Consumer/Household Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea24:343820 |
| By: | James C. Cox (Georgia State University); Cary Deck (University of Alabama and Chapman University, Economic Science Institute); Laura Razzolini (University of Alabama); Vjollca Sadiraj (Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | Deviations from choices predicted by self-regarding preferences have regularly been observed in standard dictator games. Such behavior is not inconsistent with conventional preference theory or revealed preference theory, which accommodate other-regarding preferences. By contrast, experiments in which giving nothing is not the least generous feasible act produce data that is inconsistent with conventional preference theory including social preference models and suggest the possible relevance of reference point models. Two such models are the reference-dependent theory of riskless choice with loss aversion and choice monotonicity in moral reference points. Our experiment includes novel treatments designed to challenge both theoretical models of reference dependence and conventional rational choice theory by poking holes in or adding to the dictator’s feasible set along with changes to the initial endowment of the players. Our design creates tests that at most one of these models can pass. However, we do not find that any of these models fully capture behavior. In part this result is due to our observing behavior in some treatments that differs from previous experiments for reasons attributable to implementation differences across studies. |
| Keywords: | Rational Choice Theory, Reference Dependence, Behavioral Models, Laboratory Experiments |
| JEL: | C7 C9 D9 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-13 |
| By: | Bone, John (Department of Economics, University of York); Drouvelis, Michalis (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham; CESifo, Munich); Georgalos, Konstantinos (Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School); Ray, Indrajit (Economics Section, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University) |
| Abstract: | We set up an experiment to test whether players use a payoff-irrelevant public message (BLUE or RED) as a possible sunspot to coordinate in a Battle of the Sexes game. We find that players do not play a sunspot equilibrium; instead, they learn to coordinate on a focal point and stick to this focal point even after the public signal is withdrawn. |
| Keywords: | Battle of the Sexes; Coordination; Sunspots; Focal Point |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2025–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2025/26 |