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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Raphael Flepp; Tim Pawlowski; Travis Richardson |
| Abstract: | We propose utilizing match-level suspense and surprise - which capture the entertainment utility created by competitive balance and outcome uncertainty for sports spectators - as alternative policy targets for league organizers and managers. Through simulations, we derive a benchmark range for suspense and surprise based on a perfectly balanced match before analyzing over 25, 000 men's matches (2010/11-2023/24) and 725 women's matches (2023/24) from Europe's top football leagues. Our findings reveal that an average match generates lower suspense compared to the benchmark range, particularly for top teams, while surprise values consistently align with the benchmark. Moreover, we observe nuanced trends over time in men's football and highlight notable differences across leagues and clubs in both men's and women's competitions. These insights enhance our understanding of how the attractiveness of matches arises from competitive balance and carry important policy implications. |
| Date: | 2025–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2506.21253 |
| By: | L\'aszl\'o Csat\'o |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to explore the impact of tournament design on the incentives of the contestants. We develop a simulation framework to quantify the potential gain and loss from attacking based on changes in the probability of reaching the critical ranking thresholds. The model is applied to investigate the 2024/25 UEFA Champions League reform. The novel incomplete round-robin league phase is found to create more powerful incentives for offensive play than the previous group stage, with an average increase of 119\% (58\%) regarding the first (second) prize. Our study provides the first demonstration that the tournament format itself can strongly influence team behaviour in sports. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.13141 |
| By: | Yuan, Zhenyu; Yin, Jingfeng; Sun, Jiaqing |
| Abstract: | The possibility that team conflict, especially task conflict, might improve team performance has stimulated a large body of empirical research that continues to grow to this day. Nevertheless, 12 years has passed since de Wit et al.’s (2012) comprehensive meta-analysis. To synthesize the even larger body of empirical evidence now available, we provide an updated meta-analysis of the team conflict–team performance relationships by revisiting the population average estimates and their effect size heterogeneity. Given the recent developments in the team conflict literature, we also incorporate status conflict into our synthesis. Moreover, to shed light on the contextual factors that may help explain the heterogeneous team conflict–team performance relationships, we examine a host of moderators pertaining to national culture, team features, and research methods. Our results based on psychometric meta-analysis indicate that all four team conflict dimensions (i.e., task conflict, relationship conflict, process conflict, and status conflict) are negatively related to team performance. Moreover, the relationships of task conflict and relationship conflict with team performance have substantial cross-situation heterogeneity. Examining the contingencies of these heterogeneous relationships, our metaregression analyses reveal that national culture (e.g., individualism), team features (e.g., team performance facet), and methodological factors (e.g., team conflict scale) all play important roles in helping to explain the mixed effects of team conflict on team performance. Based on our quantitative synthesis, we discuss the implications for the next waves of team conflict research. |
| Keywords: | task conflict; relationship conflict; process conflict; status conflict; meta-analysis |
| JEL: | J50 |
| Date: | 2025–08–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:129181 |
| By: | Georgy Lukyanov; David Li |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a two-player game in which the players face uncertainty regarding the nature of their partner. In this variation of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, players may encounter an 'honest' type who always cooperates. Mistreating such a player imposes a moral cost on the defector. This situation creates a trade-off, resolved in favor of cooperation if the player's trust level, or belief in their partner's honesty, is sufficiently high. We investigate whether an environment where players have explicit beliefs about each other's honesty is more or less conducive to cooperation, compared to a scenario where players are entirely uncertain about their partner's beliefs. We establish that belief diversity hampers cooperation in environments where the level of trust is relatively low and boosts cooperation in environments with a high level of trust. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.08851 |