nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2026–10–19
two papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto, DePauw University


  1. Large player classes and approximately weighted voting By Ezra Einy; Ori Haimanko
  2. What a Shorter Contest Really Costs: Serial Dependence, Effective Trials, and Evidence from a Rule Change in Professional Esports By Petr Parshakov

  1. By: Ezra Einy; Ori Haimanko
    Abstract: It is known that completeness of the coalitional ($C$-)desirability relation in a simple game does not imply the existence of a weighted-majority representation. We show that weightedness is implied in an approximate sense. Call an $n$-player simple game $\varepsilon$-weighted if, for some weight vector in the $(n-1)$-simplex, any losing coalition weight exceeds any winning coalition weight by at most $\varepsilon$; let $\varepsilon^{\ast}$ be the smallest such $\varepsilon$. We establish an upper bound on $\varepsilon^{\ast}$ in a general $C$-complete game, and deduce that, if all classes of equally desirable players become large asymptotically but the number of classes is bounded, then $\varepsilon^{\ast}=O(1/n_{\min})$ for the minimal player class size $n_{\min}$, and the bound is tight. Importantly, the minimal attainable fraction $\delta$ of coalitions mislabeled by a weighting rule also tends to $0$ when $n_{\min}\rightarrow\infty$ and the number of player classes is bounded, with $\delta=O(1/\sqrt{n_{\min}})$.
    Date: 2026–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.08968
  2. By: Petr Parshakov
    Abstract: Operational research evaluates tournament formats by their efficacy, the probability that the design identifies the stronger competitor, and computes it almost exclusively by simulation under an assumption that is rarely tested: that the trials a format aggregates are independent. We show that this assumption systematically overstates what shortening a contest costs, and we measure the correction. When trials are serially correlated, a format carries N/[1+(N-1)rho] effective trials rather than N, so a twenty per cent cut costs 10.6 per cent of discriminating power under independence but only 5.2 per cent at the correlation we estimate, and only 2.1 per cent in a sixty-trial format. The ingredients are estimated from an implemented change in contest length: in September 2023 professional Counter-Strike cut regulation rounds per map from thirty to twenty-four. Across 72, 576 maps we measure discrimination as the ability slope over the residual standard deviation on the first half of a map, a contest fixed by rule at fifteen or twelve rounds with no stopping rule. Against the calibrated benchmark of 0.948, discrimination falls by thirty-five per cent in a ten-month window around the switch (0.648, 95 per cent interval 0.52-0.81) and by ten per cent over the full panel (0.901, 0.82-0.99). The correction needs one number, recoverable from ordinary results data as a design effect.
    Date: 2026–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2610.05251

This nep-spo issue is ©2026 by Humberto Barreto. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the Griffith Business School of Griffith University in Australia.