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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Siyuan Fan; Zhonghong Kuang; Jingfeng Lu |
| Abstract: | We study the $n$-dimensional contest between two asymmetric players with different marginal effort costs, with each dimension (i.e., battle) modeled as a Tullock contest. We allow general identity-independent and budget-balanced prize allocation rules in which each player's prize increases weakly in the number of their victories, e.g., a majority rule if $n$ is odd. When the discriminatory power of the Tullock winner-selection mechanism is no greater than $2/(n+1)$, a unique equilibrium arises where each player exerts deterministic and identical effort across all dimensions. This condition applies uniformly to all eligible prize allocation rules and all levels of players' asymmetry, and it is tight. Under this condition, we derive the effort-maximizing prize allocation rule: the entire prize is awarded to the player who wins more battles than his opponent by a pre-specified margin, and the prize is split equally if neither player does. When $n$ is odd, and players are symmetric, the majority rule is optimal. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2602.21564 |
| By: | Capucine-Marin Dubroca-Voisin (LVMT - Laboratoire Ville, Mobilité, Transport - Université Gustave Eiffel - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, AREP Flux et Mobilités - AREP) |
| Abstract: | During Paris 2024 Games, pedestrian flow management in train stations was a major challenge. It was yet successful thanks to a combination of actions and factors that this presentation will explore. Notably, massive use of trained staff, cooperation of passengers, exceptional maintenance and operational resources, and a lower ridership than expected were amongst these key factors. |
| Keywords: | Paris, train stations, Olympic games, pedestrian flow management, pedestrian flow management Olympic games train stations Paris |
| Date: | 2025–09–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05436537 |
| By: | David Gill; Victoria Prowse; J. Lucas Reddinger |
| Abstract: | Teamwork and collaboration are increasingly important. To understand the dynamics of teamwork skill formation, we provide the first systematic analysis of dynamic investment in teamwork skill. First, adopting a dynamic game approach, we develop a novel theoretical framework where investment in team skill creates persistent benefits and externalities for teammates, but where investment is risky because the benefits depend on successful team coordination. Second, we take this framework to the laboratory to study empirically the factors that influence dynamic investment in team skill. We find underinvestment compared to the efficient benchmark. However, investment in team skill responds strongly to incentives, in line with specific patterns predicted by our theory. We also find that people’s theory of mind and propensity to coordinate predict how much they invest in team skill. We conclude that careful design of team incentives and selection of team members can facilitate the dynamic development of teamwork skills. |
| Keywords: | Teamwork, investment, skill, coordination, theory of mind, dynamic game, repeated game, basin of attraction, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, Stag Hunt game, experiment, machine learning |
| JEL: | C73 C92 D91 J24 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1355 |
| By: | Luca Braghieri; Leonardo Bursztyn; Jan Fasnacht |
| Abstract: | Voting-based collective decisions are typically made either anonymously or publicly. Anonymous voting protects truthful expression but conceals individual behavior; public voting provides information about individual votes, but, when one option is socially stigmatized, it can distort participation and choices. We introduce threshold majority voting, in which voters choose a disclosure threshold determining whether and when their votes are revealed. In an experiment at UC Berkeley on the participation of transgender women in women’s sports, public voting nearly doubles abstention and reduces support for the stigmatized option. Threshold voting eliminates these distortions while revealing one-third of individual votes. |
| JEL: | C93 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34827 |