|
on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Masaya Nishihata |
| Abstract: | Superstars often dominate key tasks because of their exceptional abilities, but this concentration of responsibility may unintentionally limit on-the-job learning opportunities for others. Using panel data from Major League Baseball (MLB), this study examines how superstar presence affects teammates' opportunities and career outcomes. To address potential endogeneity in team composition, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in superstar availability caused by injuries. When a superstar is active in the same team-position unit, non-star teammates play significantly less. These short-term reductions in playing time extend to longer horizons: players who begin their careers alongside a superstar who remains active for a full season (i.e., not on the injured list) are about 1.7 times more likely to exit MLB earlier than comparable peers. A key mechanism is reduced skill development -- limited playing opportunities hinder subsequent growth in offensive performance. At the team level, greater dependence on superstars raises immediate productivity but magnifies performance declines after their departure, indicating a trade-off between short-term success and long-term adaptability. Overall, the findings suggest that while concentrating key roles in top performers boosts output in the short run, it can restrict others' development and retention. Similar dynamics may arise in other organizations that rely heavily on a few exceptional individuals. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.07218 |
| By: | Itai Maimon |
| Abstract: | We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player. In this context, imbalance acts as a measure of inequality in strategy, similar to measures of inequality in wealth or population dynamics. Conversely, playability is a slight strengthening of the condition that a game has no dominated strategies. It is more accurately aligned with the intuition that all strategies should see play. We show that these balance definitions are natural by exhibiting a (2n+1)-RPS that maximizes all proposed imbalance definitions among playable RPS games. We demonstrate here that this form of imbalance aligns with the prevailing notion that different definitions of inequality for economic and game-theoretic distributions must agree on both the maximal and minimal cases. In the sequel paper, we utilize these definitions for multiplayer games to demonstrate that a generalization of this imbalanced RPS is at least nearly maximally imbalanced while remaining playable for under 50 players. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.00374 |
| By: | Yukihiko Funaki; Yukio Koriyama; Satoshi Nakada; Yuki Tamura |
| Abstract: | We study the proportional division value in TU-games, which distributes the worth of the grand coalition in proportion to each player's stand-alone worth. Focusing on fixed-population consistency, we characterize the proportional division value through three types of axioms: a homogeneity axiom, composition axioms, and a nullified-game consistency axiom. The homogeneity axiom captures scale invariance with respect to the grand coalition's worth. The composition axioms ensure that payoffs remain consistent when the game is decomposed and recomposed. The nullified-game consistency axiom requires that when some players' payoffs are fixed, the solution for the remaining players, computed in the game adjusted to account for these fixed payoffs, coincides with their original payoffs. Together with efficiency and a fairness-related axiom, these axioms characterize the proportional division value. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.05001 |
| By: | Aaron S. Berman (California Institute of Technology); Saika Cer Askin (Chapman University, Economic Science Institute); Shapeng Jiang (Wuhan University); David Porter (Chapman University, Economic Science Institute); Jason Shachat (Chapman University, Economic Science Institute) |
| Abstract: | This study examines preference-based behavioral biases in social interactions between two distinct communities: students from Chapman University in the United States and Wuhan University in China. Using controlled experiments, participants interacted within or across communities in Dictator games. Two versions of the Dictator game were used: one where decisions were observable by both the experimenter and the recipient, and another where allocators could misreport outcomes with plausible deniability. Results revealed unexpected patterns, including similar allocation distributions across communities in the transparent task, and differing behaviors in the misreporting task, with Chapman allocators being more generous to out-group members and Wuhan allocators choosing more selfishly. The study challenges traditional theories of in-group favoritism and highlights the role of cultural differences and image concerns in decision-making. Findings contribute to understanding cross-cultural interactions, particularly in the context of increasing global connectivity. |
| Keywords: | In-group bias, Dictator game, Lying, Social image |
| JEL: | C92 D63 D91 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:25-12 |