nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2025–10–27
six papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto, DePauw University


  1. Impact of Three-Point Rule Change on Competitive Balance in Football: A Synthetic Control Method Approach By Ajay Sharma
  2. The Effects of Sports Activities on Time Preferences and Risk Aversion By Komatsubara, Takashi
  3. Analyzing the Influence of Team Formation on Soccer Match Outcomes By O. Ashton Morgan; Jayjit Roy
  4. Are Final Market Prices Sufficient for Information Aggregation? Evidence from Last-Minute Dynamics in Parimutuel Betting By Hiroaki Hanyu; Shunsuke Ishii; Suguru Otani; Kazuhiro Teramoto
  5. Endogenous Incumbency in Repeated Contests By Fabian Dietz; Stephan Eitel
  6. Capital Games and Growth Equilibria By Ben Abramowitz

  1. By: Ajay Sharma
    Abstract: Governing authorities in sports often make changes to rules and regulations to increase competitiveness. One such change was made by the English Football Association in 1981 when it changed the rule for awarding points in the domestic league from two points for a win to three points. This study aims to measure this rule change's impact on the domestic league's competitive balance using a quasi-experimental estimation design of a synthetic control method. The three-point rule change led to an increase in competitive balance in the English League. Further, we show no significant change in the number of goals scored per match.
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.15405
  2. By: Komatsubara, Takashi
    Abstract: This paper investigates whether sports experience changes adolescents’ preferences. For this purpose, we conducted a survey of Japanese university students about their sports experiences, time preferences, and risk aversion. Our regression analysis shows that students’ sports experience does not significantly change their time preferences or risk aversion. This result implies that although students devote a lot of time to sports in Japan, sports still do not have a significant impact on students’ attitudes towards time and risk.
    Keywords: Sports Experience, Time Preferences, Risk Aversion, Student Survey
    JEL: D81 I21
    Date: 2025–09–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126001
  3. By: O. Ashton Morgan; Jayjit Roy
    Abstract: This paper investigates the strategic role of soccer formations on match outcomes. Using six seasons (2016Ð2022) of English Premier League data we estimate the impact of four dominant formationsÑ4-3-3, 4-4-2, 4-5-1, and wingbacksÑon expected and actual goals differential with a three-stage empirical strategy. Results from a fixed effects linear model show that playing a 4-3-3 at home yields the highest expected goal advantage across nearly all opponent formations. Predictive margins, conditional on opponent formation, further show that the wingback system also performs well at home. In contrast, the 4-4-2 formation is the least effective for away teams, likely due to being overloaded in midfield and limited press resistance. These findings align with tactical shifts over time away from a more rigid 4-4-2 formation toward more flexible systems that maximize spatial control and pressing efficiency. Key Words: Strategic Behavior; Soccer Formations; Expected Goals; English Premier League
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:25-08
  4. By: Hiroaki Hanyu; Shunsuke Ishii; Suguru Otani; Kazuhiro Teramoto
    Abstract: Most betting market models employ static frameworks that condition decisions on final odds. Using a unique dataset of interim odds from Japanese horse racing, this study examines the validity of such static analyses by asking whether there is a systematic relationship between expected returns and the trajectory of odds. We find that returns are negatively related to last-minute changes in odds, and that these late movements attenuate the favorite-longshot bias by weakening the correlation between final odds and returns. These patterns suggest that informed bettors place wagers at the final stage based on private signals, leaving surprises in final odds.
    Date: 2025–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.14645
  5. By: Fabian Dietz; Stephan Eitel
    Abstract: We consider a model of infinitely repeated lottery contests in which the winner of the prior contest (incumbent) additionally gains the opportunity to bias the subsequent contest by exerting early effort in an intermediate stage. An effortmaximizing contest designer strategically chooses the cost advantage of incumbency. We show that the contest designer prefers to set the cost advantage such that the incumbent only partially discourages the contender, i.e. the contender exerts less, but still positive, effort than in an unbiased contest. In this way, rent extraction is higher than under independent lottery contests with no intermediate stage, because (i) players compete fiercer to become the incumbent and (ii) the increase in early effort outweighs the decrease in effort in the biased contest. Therefore, we provide some rationale for incumbency advantages, for example in repeated procurement settings.
    Keywords: repeated contests, lottery contest, incumbent, discouragement effect
    JEL: C72 C73 D72
    Date: 2025–10
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bav:wpaper:244_dietz_eitel.rdf
  6. By: Ben Abramowitz
    Abstract: We examine formal games that we call "capital games" in which player payoffs are known, but their payoffs are not guaranteed to be von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. In capital games, the dynamics of player payoffs determine their utility functions. Different players can have different payoff dynamics. We make no assumptions about where these dynamics come from, but implicitly assume that they come from the players' actions and interactions over time. We define an equilibrium concept called "growth equilibrium" and show a correspondence between the growth equilibria of capital games and the Nash equilibria of standard games.
    Date: 2025–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.00472

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