nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2025–09–29
three papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto, DePauw University
  1. INNOVATIONS IN SPORTS EVENT ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT: AZERBAIJAN’S STRATEGIC CONTRIBUTIONS By Guliyeva, Aysel
  2. The Last Shall Be First: Innovation as a Head-to-Head Race By Patrick Arnold, Marc Möller, Catherine Roux
  3. Cooperative games with unpaid players By Sylvain Béal; Léa Munich; Philippe Solal; Kevin Techer
  1. By: Guliyeva, Aysel
    Abstract: This study examines Azerbaijan’s strategic innovations in hosting 2015 European Games, 2017 Islamic Solidarity Games, and 2019 European Youth Olympic Festival. It highlights infrastructure modernization, volunteer mobilization, and technological integration, assessing their role in enhancing Azerbaijan’s global sports reputation while ensuring sustainable legacies in governance, capacity building, and event management.
    Date: 2025–09–19
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:w8ch6_v1
  2. By: Patrick Arnold, Marc Möller, Catherine Roux
    Abstract: Uncertainty about the value of a contested innovation induces leaders and laggards to update their expectations in opposite directions. We characterize situations in which firms that have obtained an initial advantage are not the most likely to achieve final success. In spite of amplifying a leader’s advantage, greater contest intensity facilitates this effect, challenging the view that laggards require support to remain competitive.
    Keywords: innovation contests, learning, competitive balance, leapfrogging
    JEL: C72 D82
    Date: 2025–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp2505
  3. By: Sylvain Béal (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Léa Munich (Université Paris Panthéon Assas, CRED UR 7321, F-75005 Paris, France); Philippe Solal (Université Paris Panthéon Assas, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint-Etienne, France); Kevin Techer (Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France)
    Abstract: We consider cooperative TU-games with unpaid players, which are described by a TUgame and two categories of players, paid and unpaid. Unpaid players participate in the cooperative game but are not rewarded for their participation, for instance for legal reasons. The objective is then to determine how the contributions of unpaid players are redistributed among the paid players. To meet this goal, we introduce and characterize axiomatically three values that are inspired by the Shapley value but differ in the way they redistribute the contributions of unpaid players. These values are unified as instances of a more general two-step allocation procedure.
    Keywords: Unpaid players, Shapley value, Harsanyi dividends, axioms, two-step procedure, Priority value
    JEL: C72
    Date: 2025–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2025-11
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