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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Pedro Acioly Teixeira; Marcio Issao Nakane |
| Abstract: | This study examines the existence of Second Leg Home Advantage (SLHA) in soccer knockout matches, focusing on the Brazilian Cup. Using an instrumentalvariables approach, we construct a team quality control variable based on betting odds. Our findings indicate a significant SLHA effect, with home teams in the second leg winning between 53.9% and 55.8% of matches, after controlling for team strength. We further explore the conditional impact of first-leg results, showing that a draw in the first leg increases a second-leg home team’s probability of advancing to over 64%. Contrary to common belief, the away goals rule does not significantly affect outcomes. These results contribute to the ongoing debate on SLHA and suggest that playing the second leg at home provides a meaningful competitive advantage. The findings have implications for tournament design and team strategy in knockout competitions. |
| Keywords: | home advantage; second leg home advantage; soccer; Brazilian soccer cup |
| JEL: | Z2 Z21 |
| Date: | 2025–02–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spa:wpaper:2025wpecon4 |
| By: | Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco |
| Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment to compare the fairness and intensity of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players, a single prize, and two alternative match formats. Matches are either organized as lottery contests or all-pay auctions. Whereas we confirm the theoretical prediction that tournaments are less fair if matches are organized as all-pay auctions, we reject the predicted difference in tournament intensity. Moreover, the reason for the reduced fairness of tournaments based on all-pay auctions is also at odds with theory. In the lab, such tournaments heavily disfavor (in payoff-terms) the player acting in the final two matches. The reason is the substantially weaker than predicted discouragement of this player when competing first against the loser of the first match. Subjects try to exploit a perceived negative psychological momentum in such situations but only manage to end up in a dissipation trap: an effort-intense, final-like last match which significantly reduces their payoffs. |
| Keywords: | Sequential Round-Robin Tournament, Lottery Contest, All-Pay Auction, Laboratory Experiment, Discouragement Effect, Dissipation Trap |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D72 Z20 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:bamber:311830 |
| By: | René Van den Brink (Department of Economics and Tinbergen Institute - VU University); Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University); Agnieszka Rusinowska (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce a power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players |
| Keywords: | axiomatization; power index; plurality game; winning coalition |
| JEL: | C71 D62 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:24014 |
| By: | Higgs, James; Flowerday, Stephen |
| Abstract: | The video game market is forecasted to be valued at $321.6 billion by 2027. Today, younger generations increasingly prefer spending their leisurely time playing online video games. Beyond providing a leisurely – and often competitive – activity to the bulk of its user base, online video games provide cybercriminals with an environment that is free from the reigns of legal enforcement. More specifically, with the growing popularity and uptake of the microtransaction business model, money launderers are provided with novel channels to move their illicitly gained funds. A continuously expanding body of evidence underscores that money laundering is occurring through online video games. Foremost, cybercriminals are attracted to the anonymity and global reach offered by online video games with few to no controls currently in place to disrupt laundering processes. Furthermore, regulations are struggling to keep pace with the latest money laundering strategies employed by cybercriminals. This paper explores and discusses money laundering in the context of online video games. Core vulnerabilities enabling money laundering to occur through online video games are identified. Security controls to reduce the scale of laundering are proposed. |
| Date: | 2024–11–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fyv6c_v1 |