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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Gilles Paché (CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon) |
| Abstract: | Sports mega-events lasting several weeks pose major logistical challenges, given the massive flow of people they generate, as demonstrated by the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games. Innovative solutions implemented for the occasion, in terms of transport and the use of digital tools, helped to optimise supplies and reduce disruptions. From this viewpoint, the Paris experience could serve as a model for future improvements in urban logistics. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, Mega-events, Sport, Urban logistics |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04780300 |
| By: | Alexandre Andorra; Maximilian G\"obel |
| Abstract: | Evaluating a soccer player's performance can be challenging due to the high costs and small margins involved in recruitment decisions. Raw observational statistics further complicate an accurate individual skill assessment as they do not abstract from the potentially confounding factor of team strength. We introduce the Soccer Factor Model (SFM), which corrects this bias by isolating a player's true skill from the team's influence. We compile a novel data set, web-scraped from publicly available data sources. Our empirical application draws on information of 144 players, playing a total of over 33, 000 matches, in seasons 2000/01 through 2023/24. Not only does the SFM allow for a structural interpretation of a player's skill, but also stands out against more reduced-form benchmarks in terms of forecast accuracy. Moreover, we propose Skill- and Performance Above Replacement as metrics for fair cross-player comparisons. These, for example, allow us to settle the discussion about the GOAT of soccer in the first quarter of the twenty-first century. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2412.05911 |
| By: | Majid Ahmadi; Gwen-Jiro Clochard; Jeff Lachman; John List |
| Abstract: | When multiple forces potentially underlie discriminatory behavior, pinning down the precise sources becomes a challenge, making proposed policy solutions speculative. This study introduces an empirical approach, tightly linked to theory, to dissect two specific channels of discrimination: customer bias and managerial bias. To illustrate our framework, we integrate proprietary data with several publicly available datasets to uncover channels of discrimination within the Major League Baseball draft. Our analysis reveals that customer preferences significantly influence the drafting of players at the top end of the draft - those likely to gain immediate public attention and eventually play for the club. Conversely, we observe managerial homophily in the latter parts of the draft, where players who attract little attention and have minimal chances of playing for the club are selected. The observed preferential bias at both ends of the draft incurs a substantial opportunity cost. However, bias at the top end unduly affects competitiveness. Our findings provide significant implications for future research on measuring discrimination and addressing the challenge of multiple channels. |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00802 |
| By: | Rene van den Brink (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University); Agnieszka Rusinowska (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS) |
| Abstract: | Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce a power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players. |
| Keywords: | axiomatization; power index; plurality game; winning coalition |
| JEL: | C71 D62 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–12–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240076 |
| By: | Mikhail Drugov; Dmitry Ryvkin; Jun Zhang |
| Abstract: | We study tournaments where winning a rank-dependent prize requires passing a minimum performance standard. We show that, for any prize allocation, the optimal standard is always at a mode of performance that is weakly higher than the global mode and identify a necessary and sufficient condition for it to be at the global mode. When the prize scheme can be designed as well, the winner-take-all prize scheme is optimal for noise distributions with an increasing failure rate; and awarding equal prizes to all qualifying agents is optimal for noise distributions with a decreasing failure rate. For distributions with monotone likelihood ratios -- log-concave and log-convex, respectively -- these pay schemes are also optimal in a larger class of anonymous, monotone contracts that may depend on cardinal performance. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2412.01139 |
| By: | Yoram Halevy; Johannes C. Hoelzemann; Terri Kneeland |
| Abstract: | In the leading model of bounded rationality in games, each player best-responds to their belief that the other players reason to some finite level. This paper investigates a novel behavior that could reveal if the player’s belief lies outside the iterative reasoning model. This encompasses a situation where a player believes that their opponent can reason to a higher level than they do. We propose an identification strategy for such behavior, and evaluate it experimentally. |
| Keywords: | Bounded rationality, higher-order rationality, level-k, cognitive-hierarchy, game theory, equilibrium, rationalizability, preference elicitation, lab experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D91 |
| Date: | 2025–01–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-789 |