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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Morabito, Leo (University of Milan); Scoppa, Vincenzo (University of Calabria) |
| Abstract: | Subjective evaluations in many contexts might be affected by decision-makers' social preferences. To explore this phenomenon, we use data from soccer referees' decisions. According to soccer rules, referees are expected to evaluate each episode independently, without taking into account previous decisions. However, if referees are averse to creating inequities between teams, they might seek to balance their decisions and, for example, after awarding a penalty to the home team, they may raise the evidence threshold for awarding a second penalty to the same team, while lowering it for awarding a penalty to the away team. First, we offer a simple theoretical model to explain these insights. Then, using detailed minute-by-minute commentary data from approximately 21, 400 matches in major European leagues, we show a strong preference by referees to treat teams fairly: they reduce the probability of awarding a penalty (or a red or yellow card) to a team if it has already been awarded to that team, while increasing the probability if it has been awarded to the opposing team. In the final part, focusing on injury time, we show that referees tend to lengthen injury time both when the home team is behind and when the away team is behind, suggesting that referees may have a preference for treating both teams fairly. |
| Keywords: | subjective evaluations, social preferences, inequity aversion, compensatory behavior, social pressure, soccer, behavioral economics |
| JEL: | D91 L83 Z20 D63 Z28 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17512 |
| By: | Gómez Seeber Matías José |
| Abstract: | Does success breed success? Psychological momentum theory suggests that past achievements might influence future performance. However, distinguishing between psychological and strategic momentum — where a player's effort shifts based on relative position — is challenging. In this paper, using a novel dataset from professional Counter-Strike: Global Offensive matches, I focus on technical timeouts. These timeouts don't affect player position but may disrupt psychological momentum. I find that a winning [losing] team with significant momentum sees a 13 [11.7] percentage points increased chance of losing [winning] the following round after calling for such a timeout. This shows that psychological momentum significantly affects performance and that timeouts can reset the momentum. |
| JEL: | D2 Z0 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aep:anales:4735 |
| By: | Bagues, Manuel (University of Warwick); Villa, Carmen (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | Over the past decades, many European countries have raised the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) from 16 to 18 years. This study provides novel evidence of the impact of this policy on educational outcomes by exploiting the staggered timing of MLDA changes across Spanish regions. Raising the MLDA decreased alcohol consumption among adolescents aged 14–17 by 8 to 18% and improved their exam performance by 4% of a standard deviation. This effect appears driven by alcohol's direct impact on cognitive ability, as we find no significant changes in potential mediators like use of other substances or time spent on leisure activities, including socialising, sports, gaming, or internet use. We also observe a decrease in tranquilliser and sleeping pill use, suggesting improved mental health. Our findings indicate that reducing teenage alcohol consumption represents a significant opportunity to improve educational outcomes in Europe, where youth drinking rates remain notably high. |
| Keywords: | alcohol, adolescence, minimum legal drinking age, PISA |
| JEL: | I18 I12 I21 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17507 |
| By: | Arnab K. Basu; Nancy H. Chau; Anustup Kundu; Kunal Sen |
| Abstract: | Economic theory predicts that dishonesty thrives in secrecy. Yet, team-based decisions are ubiquitous in public policy-making. How does teamwork influence the tendency for self-dealings when public servants—both honest and corrupt—must work together to make decisions under the veil of within-group secrecy? This paper designs a field experiment guided by a theoretical model of team-level dishonesty, where we define and unpack the drivers of the dishonesty concessions that individuals make in a team setting as a cooperative bargain between team players. |
| Keywords: | Dishonest behaviour, Peer effect, Bargaining, Local government |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2024-87 |