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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Andreas Santucci; Eric Lax |
| Abstract: | It's not unreasonable to think that in-game sporting performance can be affected partly by what takes place off the court. We can't observe what happens between games directly. Instead, we proxy for the possibility of athletes partying by looking at play following games in party cities. We are interested to see if teams exhibit a decline in performance the day following a game in a city with active nightlife; we call this a "hangover effect". Part of the question is determining a reasonable way to measure levels of nightlife, and correspondingly which cities are notorious for it; we colloquially refer to such cities as "party cities". To carry out this study, we exploit data on bookmaker spreads: the expected score differential between two teams after conditioning on observable performance in past games and expectations about the upcoming game. We expect a team to meet the spread half the time, since this is one of the easiest ways for bookmakers to guarantee a profit. We construct a model which attempts to estimate the causal effect of visiting a "party city" on subsequent day performance as measured by the odds of beating the spread. In particular, we only consider the hangover effect on games played back-to-back within 24 hours of each other. To the extent that odds of beating the spread against next day opponent is uncorrelated with playing in a party city the day before, which should be the case under an efficient betting market, we have identification in our variable of interest. We find that visiting a city with active nightlife the day prior to a game does have a statistically significant negative effect on a team's likelihood of meeting bookmakers' expectations for both NBA and MLB. |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2412.21181 |
| By: | Bagues, Manuel (University of Warwick); Villa, Carmen (University of Warwick and Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | Over the past decades, many European countries have raised the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) from 16 to 18 years. This study provides novel evidence of the impact of this policy on educational outcomes by exploiting the staggered timing of MLDA changes across Spanish regions. Raising the MLDA decreased alcohol consumption among adolescents aged 14–17 by 8 to 18% and improved their exam performance by 4% of a standard deviation. This effect appears driven by alcohol’s direct impact on cognitive ability, as we find no significant changes in potential mediators like use of other substances or time spent on leisure activities, including socialising, sports, gaming, or internet use. We also observe a decrease in tranquilliser and sleeping pill use, suggesting improved mental health. Our findings indicate that reducing teenage alcohol consumption represents a significant opportunity to improve educational outcomes in Europe, where youth drinking rates remain notably high. |
| Keywords: | alcohol ; adolescence ; minimum legal drinking age ; PISA JEL Codes: I18 ; I12 ; I21 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1529 |
| By: | Burbach, Jörg |
| Abstract: | Dieses Paper untersucht die Darstellung von Zensur und Überwachung in Videospielen und analysiert, wie diese Themen durch interaktive Mechaniken erfahrbar gemacht werden. Es zeigt, wie Spiele wie Orwell oder We Happy Few nicht nur als Unterhaltung dienen, sondern kritische Fragen zu Macht, Moral und Freiheit aufwerfen. Die Verknüpfung mit Filmen und literarischen Werken wie 1984 oder Brave New World erweitert den Diskurs und verdeutlicht die universelle Relevanz dieser Themen. Das Paper lädt dazu ein, Videospiele als Reflexionsmedium zu betrachten, das über die Grenzen des Bildschirms hinaus gesellschaftliche Strukturen kritisch beleuchtet. |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the portrayal of censorship and surveillance in video games, analyzing how these themes are made tangible through interactive mechanics. It demonstrates how games like Orwell and We Happy Few serve not only as entertainment but also as platforms for raising critical questions about power, morality, and freedom. By linking these games to films and literary works such as 1984 and Brave New World, the discussion is broadened to highlight the universal relevance of these topics. The paper invites readers to view video games as a medium for reflection, critically examining societal structures beyond the confines of the screen. |
| Keywords: | Game Studies, Game Design, Zensur, Überwachung, Einschränkungen |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iudpda:308073 |
| By: | Pelloth, Daniel; Hoffmann, Patrick |
| Abstract: | The experimental study "Letting Down the Team? Social Effects of Team Incentives" by Philip Babcock and colleagues (2015) proposes that team incentives significantly enhance individual performance through social pressure and peer effects. The findings suggest that individuals are motivated by a desire to avoid disappointing their teammates, indicating that social dynamics, such as guilt and social pressure, play a crucial role in shaping behavior in team settings. In this report, we computationally reproduce the results from the original paper and perform several robustness checks. Overall, we ascertain the good reproducibility of the study and find that the results hold across the performed robustness checks. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:188 |
| By: | Li, Xinyu; Schnedler, Wendelin |
| Abstract: | Teams are formed because input from different people is needed. Providing incentives to team members, however, can be difficult. According to received wisdom, declaring all members responsible fails because real responsibility for team output "diffuses." But why? And why and when does formally declaring one member "responsible" mean that this member can be attributed "real" responsibility? We offer a model that answers these questions. We identify when jointly declaring a team responsible results in reputation free-riding. We show that declaring one person responsible can overcome this problem but only if all other team members are protected from being sanctioned. |
| Keywords: | reputation free riding, collective punishment, formal and real responsibility |
| JEL: | M54 D23 D86 L23 K12 K13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:306485 |