nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2024‒09‒30
six papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto, DePauw University


  1. High temperatures and workplace injuries By Picchio, Matteo; van Ours, Jan C.
  2. The Superstar Effect in Tennis - A within-match analysis By Carsten Creutzburg
  3. Shrouded Sin Taxes By Johannes Kasinger
  4. Games with Planned Actions and Scouting By Wolfgang Kuhle
  5. The neighborhood value for cooperative graph games By Sylvain Béal; Marc Deschamps; Rodrigue Alexandre Skoda
  6. Weight Training Builds Confidence, Grit, and Satisfaction in Adolescents By Sujong Kim, Esther Jung; Esther Jung

  1. By: Picchio, Matteo; van Ours, Jan C.
    Abstract: High temperatures can have a negative effect on workplace safety for a variety of reasons. Discomfort and reduced concentration caused by heat can lead to workers making mistakes and injuring themselves. Discomfort can also be an incentive for workers to report an injury that they would not have reported in the absence of heat. We investigate how temperature affects injuries of professional tennis players in outdoor singles matches. We find that for men injury rates increase with ambient temperatures. For women, there is no effect of high temperatures on injuries. Among male tennis players, there is some heterogeneity in the temperature effects, which seem to be influenced by incentives. Specifically, when a male player is losing at the beginning of a crucial (second) fourth set in (best-of-three) best-of-five matches, the temperature effect is much larger than when he is winning. In best-offive matches, which are more exhausting, this effect is age-dependent and stronger for older players.
    Keywords: Climate change, temperatures, tennis, injuries, health
    JEL: J24 J81 Q51 Q54
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1487
  2. By: Carsten Creutzburg (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg)
    Abstract: This study is the first to investigate the superstar effect on professional men’s tennis players’ situational performance, employing novel serve and return ratings. We innovate by examining the impact of superstars on the performance of both higher-ranked (HR) and lower-ranked (LR) players. We provide evidence that HR players deliberately increase/decrease their performance in (non)dominant match situations based on their rank and the timing of facing a superstar in subsequent matches. Similarly, there are differences in the extent of performance shifts induced by superstars among different rank groups for LR players; however, the differences do not extend to different within-match situations.
    Keywords: Superstar effect, tournaments, professionals, productivity
    JEL: J44 L83 Z21 Z22
    Date: 2024–09–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hce:wpaper:079
  3. By: Johannes Kasinger
    Abstract: Strategic shrouding of taxes by profit-maximizing firms can impair the effectiveness of corrective taxes. This paper explores tax shrouding and its consequences after the introduction of a digital sin tax designed to discourage harmful overconsumption of online sports betting in Germany. In response to the tax reform, most firms strategically shroud the tax, i.e., exclude tax surcharges from posted prices. Using an extensive novel panel data set on online betting odds, I causally estimate the effect of the tax on consumer betting prices. Consumers bear, on average, 76% of the tax burden. There is considerable and long-lasting heterogeneity in effects conditional on shrouding practices. Firms that shroud taxes can pass 90% of the tax onto consumers, while the pass-through rate is 16% for firms that directly post tax-inclusive prices. To understand the results' underlying mechanisms and policy implications, I propose an optimal corrective taxation model where oligopolistic firms compete on base prices and can shroud additive taxes. Tax shrouding is only attainable in equilibrium if (some) consumers underreact to shrouded attributes. According to the theoretical predictions, the empirically identified heterogeneity suggests that strategic tax shrouding significantly attenuates the positive corrective welfare effects of the tax. The results prompt regulating shrouding practices in the context of corrective taxation.
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2409.01493
  4. By: Wolfgang Kuhle
    Abstract: We study games in which every action requires planning and preparation. Moreover, before players act, they can revise their plans based on partially revealing information that they receive on their adversary's preparations. In turn, we examine how players' information over each others' planned actions influences winning odds in matching pennies games, and how it incentivises the use of decoys, deception, and camouflage. Across scenarios, we emphasize that the decomposition of an action into (i) a preparation to act and (ii) the execution of the action, allows to analyze one-shot simultaneous-move games, where players partially observe each others' contemporaneous actions.
    Date: 2024–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2408.09778
  5. By: Sylvain Béal (Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Marc Deschamps (Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, UR3190, F-25000 Besançon, France); Rodrigue Alexandre Skoda (Université de Paris I, Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, F-75013 Paris, France)
    Abstract: We consider cooperative games with a neighborhood structure modeled by a graph. Our approach shares some similarities with the models of graph games (Myerson, 1977) and games with a local permission structure (van den Brink and Dietz, 2014). The value that we study shares the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition equally among the coalition members and their neighbors. We characterize this value by five axioms: Efficiency, Additivity, Null neighborhood out (removing a null player whose neighbors are also null does not affect the remaining players' payoffs), Equal loss in an essential situation (if a single coalition has a non-null Harsanyi dividend and the other players are neighbors of that coalition, removing any player induces the same payoff variation for the remaining players) and Two-player symmetry (In a two-player game, the players obtain equal payoffs if they are symmetric or neighbors).
    Keywords: Shapley value, Graph games, Neighborhood, Harsanyi dividends, Axiomatization
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2024-16
  6. By: Sujong Kim, Esther Jung (Eastern Christian High School, USA); Esther Jung (Light the Universe, Brooklyn, USA)
    Abstract: Teenagers from the ages of 13 through 19 enter puberty, and their interests and body changes due to hormonal fluctuations. They become more concerned with their appearance and also get more sensitive about how they are perceived, especially regarding their reputation. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of weight training on the mental health of adolescents within this age group. A survey of 21 students, including 12 weight trainers and 9 non-weight trainers, indicated that weight training significantly improves confidence, grit, and satisfaction. Engaging in weight training during this critical developmental period provides a great foundation for teenagers during puberty, and prepares them for the future. Rather than getting distracted and consumed by video games, social media, alcohol, and other bad habits to feel better about themselves during this stressful life phase, weight training provides a healthy way to cultivate one’s mindset, self-affect, and physical health—a gamechanger for teenagers’ well-being.
    Keywords: style weight training, strength training, gym, working out, teenagers, adolescents, puberty, mental health, confidence, grit, satisfaction, consistency, routine, habit, behavioral change, mindset, diet, health, physical health, well being, emotional, and mental health
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smo:raiswp:0407

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