nep-spo 2024-06-17 papers

on Sports and Economics

Issue of 2024‒06‒17
two papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto, DePauw University

Development of loan players in professional football By Günter, Niklas; Vischer, Lars
Does Performance Pressure Accentuate Outcome Bias? Evidence from Managerial Dismissals By Fabeienne Jedelhauser; Raphael Flepp; Pascal Flurin Meier; Egon Franck

Development of loan players in professional football

By:	Günter, Niklas; Vischer, Lars
Abstract:	This study analyses the development of loan players in the German Bundesliga from 2010/2011 to 2021/2022, motivated by the increasing importance of player loans in professional football and upcoming FIFA rule changes to reduce loans. The study analyses 378 loan transfers and compares them with 6, 162 non-loan players. The focus is on the three main protagonist: the loaned player, the lending club and the loaning club. It is found that loan players do not receive more playing minutes than average Bundesliga players and that there is no recognisable increase in market value for the loaning club, which does not improve the negotiating position when selling players. In our data, the loaning club also does not benefit significantly from the sporting performances of the loaned players.
Abstract:	Diese Studie untersucht die Entwicklung von Leihspielern in der deutschen Bundesliga von 2010/2011 bis 2021/2022, motiviert durch die steigende Bedeutung der Spielerleihen im Profifußball und bevorstehende FIFA-Regeländerungen zur Reduktion von Leihen. Analysiert werden 378 Leihtransfers und mit 6.162 Nicht-Leihspielern verglichen. Der Fokus liegt auf den drei Hauptakteuren: dem verliehenen Spieler, dem verleihenden und dem ausleihenden Verein. Es zeigt sich, dass Leihspieler nicht mehr Spielminuten erhalten als durchschnittliche Bundesligaspieler und keine Marktwertsteigerung für den verleihenden Verein erkennbar ist, was die Verhandlungsposition beim Spielerverkauf nicht verbessert. Der ausleihende Verein profitiert in unseren Daten ebenfalls nicht signifikant von den sportlichen Leistungen der Leihspieler.
Keywords:	Bundesliga, Development, Football, Loan Player, Market Value
JEL:	J41 L83 M55 Z20 Z21 Z22
Date:	2024
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:umiodp:295740&r=

Does Performance Pressure Accentuate Outcome Bias? Evidence from Managerial Dismissals

By:	Fabeienne Jedelhauser (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Raphael Flepp (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Pascal Flurin Meier (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Egon Franck (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)
Abstract:	Outcome bias refers to the tendency to overweight the informativeness of observed outcomes in evaluations, consequently underestimating the influence of luck. However, observed outcomes that fall short of expectations simultaneously trigger performance pressure, potentially reinforcing outcome bias in evaluation decisions such as managerial dismissals. Using data from European football, we investigate whether managerial dismissal decisions are influenced by luck operationalized as opponent player injuries and whether this influence is more pronounced under performance pressure. Our findings reveal that luck significantly impacts dismissal decisions, particularly as performance pressure mounts. Importantly, this amplified outcome bias under performance pressure is predominantly driven by instances of bad luck. These results suggest that the extent of outcome bias has been underappreciated, especially in situations involving bad luck.
Keywords:	Outcome Bias, Luck, Performance Pressure, Managerial Dismissal, Principal-Agent Setting
JEL:	D81 D86 D91 J44 Z2
Date:	2024–05
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zrh:wpaper:402&r=

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