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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Piasenti, Stefano (Humboldt University); Valente, Marica (University of Innsbruck); Van Veldhuizen, Roel (Department of Economics, Lund University); Pfeifer, Gregor (University of Sydney) |
| Abstract: | How do men and women differ in their persistence after experiencing failure in a competitive environment? We tackle this question by combining a large online experiment (N=2, 086) with machine learning. We find that when losing is unequivocally due to merit, both men and women exhibit a significant decrease in subsequent tournament entry. However, when the prior tournament is unfair, i.e., a loss is no longer necessarily based on merit, women are more discouraged than men. These results suggest that transparent meritocratic criteria may play a key role in preventing women from falling behind after experiencing a loss. |
| Keywords: | Competitiveness; Gender; Fairness; Machine learning; Online experiment |
| JEL: | C14 C90 D91 J16 |
| Date: | 2023–08–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2023_007&r=spo |
| By: | Mattinen, Topias (Tampere University); Macey, Joseph; Hamari, Juho |
| Abstract: | The convergence of gaming and gambling, known as "gamblification", has been a topic of increasing interest in recent years. Loot boxes, i.e., rewards offering randomized content in exchange for money or time, have been a particular focal point. Research has shown links between excessive loot box consumption and problematic consumption behaviors, leading to several attempts to regulate loot boxes. Arguments against regulation have been that loot boxes are conceptually and structurally akin to other unregulated game formats, such as collectible card games. However, this discourse is often without deeper analysis of the mechanics of different products at the center of convergence. Therefore, to add to this knowledge, this article examines the similarities and differences between booster packs in Magic Arena, their physical counterparts in Magic: The Gathering, and loot boxes included in digital games. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which these booster packs compare to loot boxes in terms of consumption patterns, visual appearance, contextual factors, and regulation. Analysis reveals that digital booster packs in Magic Arena differ from both loot boxes and physical card packs, both due to their direct impact on gameplay, and their unique features afforded by the digital environment in which they exist. |
| Date: | 2023–08–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:s9xqt&r=spo |
| By: | Bernhard K Meister; Henry C W Price |
| Abstract: | A sequence of spin-1/2 particles polarised in one of two possible directions is presented to an experimenter, who can wager in a double-or-nothing game on the outcomes of measurements in freely chosen polarisation directions. Wealth is accrued through astute betting. As information is gained from the stream of particles, the measurement directions are progressively adjusted, and the portfolio growth rate is raised. The optimal quantum strategy is determined numerically and shown to differ from the classical strategy, which is associated with the Kelly criterion. The paper contributes to the development of quantum finance, as aspects of portfolio optimisation are extended to the quantum realm. |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2308.01305&r=spo |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (Paris School of Economics and U. Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne); Stéphane Luchini (Aix-Marseille U., CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, Aix-Marseille School of Economics); Jason F. Shogren (Department of Economics, U. Wyoming); Adam Zylbersztejn (Univ Lyon, Université Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France; research fellow at Vistula University Warsaw (AFiBV), Warsaw, Poland) |
| Abstract: | Social norms like the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitate economic exchange. But this reciprocity norm requires trust among traders, which can be challenging to create among strangers even with communication. The honesty oath is a time-honored mechanism that societies use to overcome this challenge – taking a solemn oath to tell the truth sends a trustworthy signal of real economic commitment given incomplete contracts. Herein we explore how the truth-telling oath creates trust within the sequential reciprocity trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Four key results emerge: (1) communication under oath creates more trust and cooperative behavior; but (2) the oath induces a selection effect – it makes people more wary of using communication as a signal. (3) Although the overall net effect on cooperation is positive, the oath cannot reverse a general decay of cooperation over time. (4) By comparing the oath's performance to mild and deterrent fines for deception, we find that the oath is behaviorally equivalent to mild fines. The deterrent fine induces the highest level of cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Trust game; cooperation; communication; commitment; deception; fine; oath |
| JEL: | C72 D83 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2311&r=spo |