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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Budzinski, Oliver |
| Abstract: | This comment addresses the opinion of the Advocate General (AG) of the European Court of Justice on the pending case European Super League versus UEFA/FIFA. It takes a critical perspective on selected aspects of the opinion's reasoning from a (sports) economics perspective. Highlighting the special characteristics of sports markets, the assessment of the AG Opinion raises questions such as (i) the (lack of) empirical evidence that the incumbent pursues and/or meets the legitimate objectives while the latter is still used as justifying reasons for anticompetitive conduct and arrangements (section III), (ii) the prohibitive entry barriers raised by the non-existence of a transparent and non-discriminatory authorization system preventing open competition for championships formats and organization by objective and effect (section IV), and (iii) the difficult search for a convincing theory of harm justifying the brutal enforcement of single-homing by the incumbent (section V). |
| Keywords: | European football, sports economics, antitrust, competition policy, Super League, Champions League, abuse of dominance, market power |
| JEL: | Z20 K21 L12 L40 L83 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:173&r=spo |
| By: | Brams, Steven; Ismail, Mehmet S.; Kilgour, Marc |
| Abstract: | Winning the coin toss at the end of a tied soccer game gives a team the right to choose whether to kick either first or second on all five rounds of penalty kicks, when each team is allowed one kick per round. There is considerable evidence that the right to make this choice, which is usually to kick first, gives a team a significant advantage. To make the outcome of a tied game fairer, we suggest a rule that handicaps the team that kicks first (A), requiring it to succeed on one more penalty kick than the team that kicks second (B). We call this the m - n rule and, more specifically, propose (m, n) = (5, 4): For A to win, it must successfully kick 5 goals before the end of the round in which B kicks its 4th; for B to win, it must succeed on 4 penalty kicks before A succeeds on 5. If both teams reach (5, 4) on the same round—when they both kick successfully at (4, 3)—then the game is decided by round-by-round “sudden death, ” whereby the winner is the first team to score in a subsequent round when the other team does not. We show that this rule is fair in tending to equalize the ability of each team to win a tied game in a penalty shootout. We also discuss a related rule that precludes the teams from reaching (5, 4) at the same time, obviating the need for sudden death and extra rounds. |
| Keywords: | Soccer, football, tie game, penalty shootouts, scoring rule |
| JEL: | C61 C72 |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:116352&r=spo |
| By: | Mehmet S. Ismail |
| Abstract: | In this note, I introduce a new framework called $n$-person general-sum games with partial information, in which boundedly rational players have only limited information about the game -- including actions, outcomes, and other players. For example, playing an actual game of chess is a game of partial information. To analyze these games, I introduce a set of new concepts and metrics for measuring the performance of players, with a focus on the interplay between human- and machine-based decision-making. Specifically, I introduce (i) gaming-proofness, which is a property of a mechanism that players cannot game from a practical perspective, and (ii) the Net Game Points (NGP) mechanism, which measures the success of a player's performance in a game, taking into account both the outcome of the game and the ``mistakes'' made during the game. The NGP mechanism provides a practicable way to assess game outcomes and can potentially be applied to a wide range of games, from poker and football to AI systems, organizations, and companies. To illustrate the concept, I apply the NGP mechanism to select chess games played between some of the world's top players, including the world champion. |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2302.13937&r=spo |
| By: | Luc Arrondel (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Jean-Pascal Gayant (IUT de Saint Malo - IUT de Saint Malo - Université de Rennes I, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | The paper studies the pricing of tickets by considering the tradeoff between maximizing match day revenues, through high prices, and maximizing the support of the most demonstrative fans, through low prices, in order to increase the number of victories, hence the revenue from TV rights. We model the role of effusive spectators and show that, in a competitive equilibrium, it may be optimal for the club to subsidize their presence in order to take full advantage of the 12th man effect. |
| Keywords: | Sports Economics, Ticket pricing, TV rights, supporters |
| Date: | 2023–01–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03962599&r=spo |
| By: | Budzinski, Oliver; Feddersen, Arne; Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp |
| Abstract: | Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet drei zentrale Diskussionsbereiche mit Blick auf die Anwendung des Wettbewerbsrechts auf kommerzialisierte Sportmärkte im Allgemeinen und Märkte für den europäischen Spitzenfußball im Speziellen. Hierbei handelt es sich um die wettbewerbspolitische und sportökonomische Bewertung der Zentralvermarktung von Übertragungsrechten, der sog. 50plus1-Sonderregel im deutschen Fußball sowie die fundamentale Frage der Marktmacht von marktinternen Regulierern (z.B. UEFA oder DFB) und ihrer Begrenzung. Die Gemeinsamkeit dieser drei Diskussionsbereichen liegt in der sportspezifischen Besonderheit, dass eine (marktinterne) Regulierung in der Regel als notwendig anerkannt wird - allerdings häufig, ohne dass gleichzeitig Handlungsspielräume und Anreize für Marktmachtmissbrauch durch den marktinternen Regulierer angemessen berücksichtigt werden. Anhand der drei Beispiele werden Marktmacht, Handlungsspielraum und antikompetitive Dual-Role-Anreize von Sportverbänden diskutiert, wobei ein Hauptaugenmerk auf die Einbindung von (empirischer) sportökonomischer Evidenz gelegt wird. |
| Keywords: | Sportökonomik, Wettbewerbsökonomik, Fußball, Zentralvermarktung, UEFA, Super League, 50plus1-Regel, Kartell, Dual Role, Marktmacht |
| JEL: | Z20 K21 L12 L40 L83 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:174&r=spo |
| By: | Robert Akerlof (University of Warwick); Hongyi Li (School of Economics, UNSW Business School); Jonathan Yeo (Nanyang Technological University) |
| Abstract: | This paper constructs a new game—the “rule-the-roost game”—where players compete repeatedly for power (“chickens”) and wealth (“eggs”) in the laboratory. We find that a vicious circle develops where the powerful accumulate more power and wealth over time, leading to substantial inequality. At the same time, the powerless take actions to oppose the powerful, which meaningfully reduces inequality. Gender differences are small in early rounds of the game but grow over time. The ratio of the female win rate to the male win rate declines by 1.3 percent each round, or 37.7 percent over the entire game. We argue that the growing difference is due to the vicious circle, which compounds the effects of small style-of-play differences. These findings suggest that gender imbalances may be particularly large in contexts such as firms where men and women interact repeatedly. |
| Keywords: | power, inequality, hierarchy, gender differences |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-03&r=spo |
| By: | Olga Kalantzi; Dimitrios Tsiotas; Serafeim Polyzos |
| Abstract: | Greece constitutes a coastal country with a lot of geomorphologic, climatic, cultural and historic peculiarities favoring the development of many aspects of tourism. Within this framework, this article examines what are the effects of tourism in Greece and how determinative these effects are, by applying a macroscopic analysis on empirical data for the estimation of the contribution of tourism in the Greek Economy. The available data regard records of the Balance of Payments in Greece and of the major components of the Balance of the Invisible Revenues, where a measurable aspect of tourism, the Travel or Tourism Exchange, is included. At the time period of the available data (2000-2012) two events of the recent Greek history are distinguished as the most significant (the Olympic Games in the year 2004 and the economic crisis initiated in the year 2009) and their impact on the diachronic evolution in the tourism is discussed. Under an overall assessment, the analysis illustrated that tourism is a sector of the Greek economy, which is described by a significant resilience, but it seems that it has not yet been submitted to an effective developmental plan exploiting the endogenous tourism dynamics of the country, suggesting currently a promising investment of low risk for the economic growth of country and the exit of the economic crisis |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2302.13121&r=spo |