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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Marius Ötting (Deparment of Business Administration and Economics and Department of Sport Science, Bielefeld University); Christian Deutscher (Deparment of Business Administration and Economics and Department of Sport Science, Bielefeld University); Carl Singleton (Department of Economics, University of Reading); Luca De Angelis (Department of Economics, University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | Sports betting markets are proven real-world laboratories to test theories of asset pricing anomalies and risky behaviour. Using a high-frequency dataset provided directly by a major bookmaker, containing the odds and amounts staked throughout German Bundesliga football matches, we test for evidence of momentum in the betting and pricing behaviour after equalising goals. We find that bettors see value in teams that have the apparent momentum, staking about 40\% more on them than teams that just conceded an equaliser. Still, there is no evidence that such perceived momentum matters on average for match outcomes or is associated with the bookmaker offering favourable odds. We also confirm that betting on the apparent momentum would lead to substantial losses for bettors. |
| Keywords: | Behavioural bias, Betting markets, Market efficiency, Momentum, Risk-taking |
| JEL: | G14 G41 L83 Z2 |
| Date: | 2022–11–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2022-10&r=spo |
| By: | Julien Benistant; Fabio Galeotti (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of competition on morals using a dynamic variant of the die-under-the-cup task. Players can repeatedly misreport the outputs of consecutive die rolls to earn more money, either under an individual piece-rate pay scheme or in a two-player tournament. In this dynamic setting, we disentangle the effect of the incentive scheme and the effect of information provision about one's relative performance, by comparing settings with continuous vs. final ex post feedback on the counterpart's reported outcome. We find that individuals lie more under competitive rather than non-competitive incentive schemes, but only if both players can cheat in the tournament. Continuous feedback on the counterpart's reports does not increase cheating in the tournament, while it does under the piece-rate scheme. These findings shed light on the effects that different competition and information policies have on morals in occupational settings. |
| Keywords: | Dishonesty,feedback,peer effects,competitive incentives,experiment |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03805532&r=spo |