nep-spo 2021-08-30 papers

on Sports and Economics

Issue of 2021‒08‒30
two papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto
DePauw University

Organizational structures and efficiency of Moroccan professional football clubs By Rania El Modni; Mounime Elkabbouri
Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games By Pangallo, Marco; Heinrich, Torsten; Jang, Yoojin; Scott, Alex; Tarbush, Bassel; Wiese, Samuel; Mungo, Luca

Organizational structures and efficiency of Moroccan professional football clubs

By:	Rania El Modni (Laboratory of Finance, Audit and Organizational Governance Research); Mounime Elkabbouri (Laboratory of Finance, Audit and Organizational Governance Research)
Abstract:	Regardless of their structure and form (public/private), organizations are often faced with structural choices. These choices can be the result of their history, their activity, the people involved or the strategies pursued. At each stage, managers have to make structural choices that allow them to be in the best possible configuration to be effective. Therefore, these sports organizations must have a structure that allows them to ensure the best possible coordination between departments. The objective of this paper is to identify structural models and examine the relationship between structure and efficiency in Moroccan soccer clubs. The three organizational design parameters: formalization, centralization, and specialization were examined to determine the structural patterns of Moroccan soccer clubs. The study was carried out with a sample of 15 Moroccan sports clubs. A total of 72 staff members responded to an online survey. The results found show the presence of two structural models: the divisional structure and the functional structure. The MANCOVA procedures showed differences between clubs in terms of sports performance. There is a significant difference between clubs with a functional structure and those with a divisional structure in sports performance, with clubs with a divisional structure generally performing significantly better than those with a functional design because football clubs choose to orient their structure according to the basic criteria of specialization, centralization and formalization.
Keywords:	Structure,Effectiveness,Formalization,Centralization,Specialization,Football clubs.
Date:	2021–07–06
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03312913&r=

Best-Response Dynamics, Playing Sequences, And Convergence To Equilibrium In Random Games

By:	Pangallo, Marco; Heinrich, Torsten; Jang, Yoojin; Scott, Alex; Tarbush, Bassel; Wiese, Samuel; Mungo, Luca
Abstract:	We show that the playing sequence–the order in which players update their actions–is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random n-player m-action games under three distinct playing sequences: clockwork sequences (players take turns according to a fixed cyclic order), random sequences, and simultaneous updating by all players. We analytically characterize the convergence properties of the clockwork sequence best-response dynamic. Our key asymptotic result is that this dynamic almost never converges to a pure Nash equilibrium when n and m are large. By contrast, the random sequence best-response dynamic converges almost always to a pure Nash equilibrium when one exists and n and m are large. The clockwork best-response dynamic deserves particular attention: we show through simulation that, compared to random or simultaneous updating, its convergence properties are closest to those exhibited by three popular learning rules that have been calibrated to human game-playing in experiments (reinforcement learning, fictitious play, and replicator dynamics).
Keywords:	Best-response dynamics, equilibrium convergence, random games, learning models in games
JEL:	C62 C72 C73 D83
Date:	2021–01
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amz:wpaper:2021-02&r=

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