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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Christoph Schlembach; Sascha L. Schmidt; Dominik Schreyer; Linus Wunderlich |
| Abstract: | Forecasting the number of Olympic medals for each nation is highly relevant for different stakeholders: Ex ante, sports betting companies can determine the odds while sponsors and media companies can allocate their resources to promising teams. Ex post, sports politicians and managers can benchmark the performance of their teams and evaluate the drivers of success. To significantly increase the Olympic medal forecasting accuracy, we apply machine learning, more specifically a two-staged Random Forest, thus outperforming more traditional na\"ive forecast for three previous Olympics held between 2008 and 2016 for the first time. Regarding the Tokyo 2020 Games in 2021, our model suggests that the United States will lead the Olympic medal table, winning 120 medals, followed by China (87) and Great Britain (74). Intriguingly, we predict that the current COVID-19 pandemic will not significantly alter the medal count as all countries suffer from the pandemic to some extent (data inherent) and limited historical data points on comparable diseases (model inherent). |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2012.04378&r=all |
| By: | Carl Singleton (Department of Economics, University of Reading); Alex Bryson (Department of Quantitative Social Science, Institute of Education); Peter Dolton (Department of Economics, University of Sussex); J. James Reade (Department of Economics, University of Reading); Dominik Schreyer (Wissenschaftliche Hochschule für Unternehmensführung (WHU)) |
| Abstract: | The economics of sport and how sport provides insights into economics have experienced exogenous shocks from Covid-19, facilitating many natural experiments. These have provided partial answers to questions of: how airborne viruses may spread in crowds; how crowds respond to the risk and information about infection; how the absence of crowds may affect social pressure and arbitration decisions; and how quickly betting markets respond to new information. We review this evidence and advise how sports economics research could continue to be most valuable to policymakers. |
| Keywords: | Sports Economics, Coronavirus, Natural Experiments, Referee Bias, Social Pressure, Prediction Markets |
| JEL: | D91 L83 Z20 |
| Date: | 2021–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2021-01&r=all |
| By: | Torsten Heinrich; Yoojin Jang; Luca Mungo; Marco Pangallo; Alex Scott; Bassel Tarbush; Samuel Wiese |
| Abstract: | We show that the playing sequence--the order in which players update their actions--is a crucial determinant of whether the best-response dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we analyze the probability that the best-response dynamic converges to a pure Nash equilibrium in random $n$-player $m$-action games under three distinct playing sequences: clockwork sequences (players take turns according to a fixed cyclic order), random sequences, and simultaneous updating by all players. We analytically characterize the convergence properties of the clockwork sequence best-response dynamic. Our key asymptotic result is that this dynamic almost never converges to a pure Nash equilibrium when $n$ and $m$ are large. By contrast, the random sequence best-response dynamic converges almost always to a pure Nash equilibrium when one exists and $n$ and $m$ are large. The clockwork best-response dynamic deserves particular attention: we show through simulation that, compared to random or simultaneous updating, its convergence properties are closest to those exhibited by three popular learning rules that have been calibrated to human game-playing in experiments (reinforcement learning, fictitious play, and replicator dynamics). |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2101.04222&r=all |
| By: | Benistant, Julien (GATE, University of Lyon); Galeotti, Fabio (CNRS, GATE); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic variant of the die-under-the-cup task where players can repeatedly misreport the outcomes of consecutive die rolls to earn more money, either under a non- competitive piece rate scheme or in a two-player competitive tournament. In this dynamic setting we test (i) whether giving continuous feedback (vs. final ex post feedback) on the opponent's reported outcome to both players encourages cheating behavior, and (ii) to what extent this influence depends on the incentive scheme in use (piece rate vs. tournament). We also vary whether the opponent is able to cheat or not. We find that people lie more when placed in a competitive rather than a non-competitive setting, but only if both players can cheat in the tournament. Continuous feedback on the counterpart's reports increases cheating under the piece-rate scheme but not in a competitive setting. Our results provide new insights on the role that feedback plays on cheating behavior in dynamic settings under different payment schemes, and shed light on the origins of the effect of competition on dishonesty. |
| Keywords: | dishonesty, feedback, peer effects, competitive incentives, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 M52 D83 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14014&r=all |
| By: | Luc Arrondel (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Richard Duhautois (LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM]); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Dans cet article, nous analysons les séances de tirs au but lors des matchs de football dans trois compétitions : |
| Keywords: | penalty shoot-outs,first-mover advantage,emotions,pressure |
| Date: | 2020–12–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-03095074&r=all |
| By: | Anna Lovasz (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Toth Kalman u. 4. Budapest, 1097 Hungary and University of Washington Tacoma, 1900 Commerce Street, Tacoma, WA 98402-3100, USA); Boldmaa Bat-Erdene (Eotvos Lorand University, Pazmany Peter setany 1/a, Budapest, 1117 Hungary); Ewa Cukrowska-Torzewska (University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, D³uga 44/50, 00-241 Warsaw, Poland); Mariann Rigo (University of Düsseldorf, Institute of Medical Sociology, Moorenstr. 5, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany); Agnes Szabo-Morvai (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Toth Kalman u. 4. Budapest, 1097 Hungary and University of Debrecen, Economics Department, Böszörményi út 132, Debrecen, 4032 Hungary) |
| Abstract: | We study gender differences in the impacts of competition and subjective feedback, using an online game with pop-up texts and graphics as treatments. We define 8 groups: players see a Top 10 leaderboard or not (competitiveness), and within these, they receive no feedback, supportive feedback, rewarding feedback, or "trash talk" (feedback type). Based on 5191 participants, we find that competition only increases the performance of males. However, when it is combined with supportive feedback, the performance of females also increases. This points to individualized feedback as a potential tool for decreasing gender gaps in competitive settings such as STEM fields. |
| Keywords: | Gender Gaps, Competition, Supervisory Feedback |
| JEL: | I20 J16 J24 M54 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:2101&r=all |
| By: | Bergantiños, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. |
| Abstract: | We study the sharing of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for La Liga, which is strongly regulated by the Spanish government since 2015. Regulation imposes, somewhat surprisingly, that lower bounds and performance measures outweigh the capability (of each club) to generate resources from selling broadcasting rights. Also, more disturbingly, the latter dimension cannot be rationalized by a sharing rule with solid normative grounds. |
| Keywords: | La Liga, broadcasting rights, sport leagues, resource allocation |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2020–12–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:104750&r=all |
| By: | Deren Caglayan; Emin Karagözoglu; Kerim Keskin; Cagri Saglam |
| Abstract: | We propose a novel tournament design that incorporates the main properties of a round-robin tournament, a Swiss tournament, and a race. Following an equilibrium analysis, we compare 36 tournament structures inherent in our model and several well-known tournament models from the literature, on the basis of expected total equilibrium effort. We show that two of the tournament structures we introduce outperform all the other tournament structures considered. |
| Keywords: | contest, multi-player contest, race, round-robin tournament, Swiss tournament, tournament |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8761&r=all |