nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2019‒06‒24
three papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto
DePauw University
  1. Sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport events By Bergantiños, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
  2. A family of rules to share the revenues from broadcasting sport events By Bergantiños, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
  3. National sport federations and public intervention: a public-private management between synergies and tensions between actors. By Bastien Viollet
  1. By: Bergantiños, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
    Abstract: We study the problem of sharing the revenue from broadcasting sport events, among participating players. We provide direct, axiomatic and game-theoretical foundations for two focal rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. The former allocates the revenues generated from broadcasting each game equally among the participating players in the game. The latter concedes players in each game the revenues generated by their respective fans and divides equally the residual. We also provide an application studying the case of sharing the revenue from broadcasting games in La Liga, the Spanish Football League. We show that hybrid schemes, combining our rules with lower bounds and performance measures, yield close outcomes to the current allocation being implemented by the Spanish National Professional Football League Association.
    Keywords: resource allocation, broadcasting, sport events, concede-and-divide, Shapley value.
    JEL: C72
    Date: 2018–03–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:94311&r=all
  2. By: Bergantiños, Gustavo; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
    Abstract: We consider the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sport league events, introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2019). We characterize a family of rules compromising between two focal and somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. The characterization only makes use of three basic axioms: equal treatment of equals, additivity and maximum aspirations. We also show further interesting features of the family: (i) if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then a majority voting equilibrium exists; (ii) the rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked according to the Lorenz dominance criterion; (iii) the family provides rationale for existing schemes in real-life situations.
    Keywords: resource allocation, broadcasting, sport events, concede-and-divide, equal-split.
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2019–06–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:94310&r=all
  3. By: Bastien Viollet (Université de Poitiers - Faculté des Sciences du sport - Université de Poitiers)
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02145781&r=all
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