|
on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Faz?l GÖKGÖZ (Ankara University); Engin YALÇIN (Ankara University) |
| Abstract: | It is crucial to analyze football teams since football has increasingly become a significant industry within the economy. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been applied to many branches and especially to football. This paper investigates the technical efficiency levels of national teams participating in World Cup 2014 to shed light on the sport performance. Input oriented CCR/BCC model and super efficiency analyses have been used to investigate the football efficiencies. In this study, passes completed, attempts on target and possession are used as input while the only output is goal scored. The results have illustrated that World Cup winner Germany is found as efficient on both CCR and BCC model. On the other hand, only four teams are technically efficient within 32 teams while nine teams have demonstrated pure efficiency. Colombia is the most efficient team for both CCR and BCC super efficiency model. In this regard, we may conclude that efficiency would be a viable instrument in analyzing the football teams. |
| Keywords: | DEA, World Cup, Football Efficiency. |
| JEL: | C60 C61 L83 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:7010135&r=spo |
| By: | Caspi, Itamar; Mazar, Yuval; Michelson, Noam; Tsur, Shay |
| Abstract: | Does guilt affect performance? Exploiting a novel measure of the justification of penalty calls, we find that unjustified penalty calls negatively affect penalty conversion rates, and that this effect increases with social norms of trust. Exploiting the variance arising from players who do not play in their countries of origin by including the norms of both the league and the kickers’ countries of origin, we separate the constraints on egoism into two categories: internal sanctions, such as guilt, and external sanctions, such as shame. We find that both guilt and shame affect the performance of penalty kickers. |
| Keywords: | Guilt, performance, soccer, football, penalty kicks, Europe. |
| JEL: | D81 L83 |
| Date: | 2018–11–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:90113&r=spo |
| By: | Judit Pál |
| Abstract: | Le sport occupe une place essentielle dans la vie des élèves. La pratique régulière d’une activité physique peut réduire les risques d’obésité, les troubles anxieux, le manque d’estime de soi et le harcèlement chez les adolescents, et les aider à mener une vie plus active et plus saine une fois à l’âge adulte. Toutefois, les cours d’éducation physique et la pratique d’activités sportives en dehors du cadre scolaire sont en concurrence avec nombre d’autres activités essentielles dans l’emploi du temps déjà chargé des élèves, notamment les devoirs et l’étude. Les professionnels de l’éducation et les parents peuvent se demander si les enfants consacrent assez (ou peut-être trop) de temps à la pratique d’activités physiques, et dans quelle mesure elle est liée aux résultats scolaires des élèves et à leur bien-être. |
| Date: | 2018–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:edudde:86-fr&r=spo |
| By: | Robertson, Matthew J. (Coventry University) |
| Abstract: | I study contests in which each player is ranked by a scoring rule based on both her performance and how close this performance is to a private target, set before the contest. Each player’s decision problem is to choose her target when performance is subject to a random component. I analyse the incentive properties of target setting, derive conditions on the primitives such that equilibria exist and characterise the players’ behaviour. I show that target setting generates outcome uncertainty under a large class of conditions. In particular, neither private abilities nor perfectly correlated states are necessary. Target setting, therefore, has important implications in contest design as outcome uncertainty is a salient determinant of consumers’ demand for contests. JEL classification numbers: C70 ; D81 ; D82 ; Z20 |
| Keywords: | contests ; target setting ; competitive balance ; incentives ; incomplete information |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wcreta:47&r=spo |