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on Sports and Economics |
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Issue of 2018‒05‒14
three papers chosen by João Carlos Correia Leitão Universidade da Beira Interior |
| By: | Harashima, Taiji |
| Abstract: | In professional sports, superstars can earn extremely high incomes compared with those of other players. The existence of superstars in team sports is interesting because, unlike in individual sports, it is the teams that compete, not the individual players. This paper examines the mechanism of how an individual player can be a superstar even in the context of team sports. The key to the mechanism is that the probability of winning differs tremendously depending on whether or not a team has top-ranked players (i.e., those with relatively high abilities). This factor, combined with the effect of ranking preference, means that the salaries of players increase exponentially from the bottom- to the top-ranked player. As a result, a top-ranked player can be a superstar even in team sports. |
| Keywords: | Superstar; Team sport; Income inequality; Ranking Value; Ranking preference; Monopoly; Monopoly profit |
| JEL: | D31 D42 D63 J30 L83 |
| Date: | 2018–04–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:86360&r=spo |
| By: | Franziska K. Kruse (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg); Wolfgang Maennig (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether soccer players collect their fifth yellow card and their suspension by choice. Using data for the German Bundesliga for the seasons 13/14 to 16/17, we show that the quality of the player’s own team, the quality of the teams participating in the next matches, and whether a team wins or not increase the probability of a player collecting his fifth yellow card. |
| Keywords: | Soccer, decision making, suspension by choice |
| JEL: | L83 D91 C23 |
| Date: | 2018–05–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hce:wpaper:064&r=spo |
| By: | Luc Arrondel (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Richard Duhautois (LIRSA - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche en Sciences de l'Action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM], CEET - Centre d'études de l'emploi et du travail - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé); Jean-François Laslier (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The paper studies sequences of penalty kicks during football shout-outs in French cup competitions. We seek to analyze in detail the psychological effects to which the kicker responds: fear of winning, fear of losing, expected outcomes or how much is at stake. The main conclusion of our study is that the performance (the probability of scoring) is impacted negatively by both what is at stake (the impact of my scoring on the expected probability that my team eventually wins) and by the difficulty of the situation (the ex ante probability of my team eventually losing). We find no advantage for a team to take the first kick. |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01785306&r=spo |