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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Cornel Nesseler (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Carlos Gomez-Gonzalez (Facultad Derecho y CC. Soziales, University of Castilla-La Mancha); Helmut Dietl (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Julio del Corral (Facultad Derecho y CC. Soziales, University of Castilla-La Mancha) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we examine how the number of African American and White American coaches in college basketball evolved since 1947. Particularly, we focus on 1973 when the league split up. The separation created asymmetric regulatory requirements. This led to a significant difference in the number of African American coaches. The evidence suggests that less regulated institutions employ fewer African American coaches. The results are time consistent, not clustered geographically, and unrelated to specific institutions. Our results have policy implications for college sports as well as other industries which have similar working conditions. |
| JEL: | J16 J7 L83 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zrh:wpaper:371&r=spo |
| By: | Thomas (T.L.P.R.) Peeters (Erasmus School of Economics, ERIM; Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands); Stefan Szymanski (University of Michigan); Marko Terviö (Aalto University) |
| Abstract: | We study hiring in a labor market where worker ability can only be observed on-the-job, but quickly becomes public information after labor market entry. We show that firms in these markets have a socially inefficient incentive to hire low talented, experienced workers instead of more promising labor market entrants, either when an extremely poor hire may bankrupt the firm, or when workers cannot commit to long-term contracts. In a dataset covering 38 years of hiring in the English labor market for football managers, we find that in around one quarter of all cases, where a firm hires an experienced worker, this experienced worker has an estimated ability below the average ability of recent labor market entrants. We argue this hiring behavior is inefficient, because it has persistently depressed the average ability of the active manager labor force over our sample period. |
| Keywords: | hiring; labor market entrants; worker ability; European football |
| JEL: | M51 J63 J24 |
| Date: | 2017–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170116&r=spo |