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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Dilger, Alexander |
| Abstract: | A simple decision theoretic model shows the doping incentives for a member of a professional sports team. Depending on the detection probability and the punishment, a sportsman dopes not at all, at a medium or at the maximal level. The whole team has a higher incentive than an individual team member that at least some of its members dope. That there are not many proven cases of doping in team sports could be because doping is less effective or because the incentives to cover it are higher than in individual sports. |
| JEL: | D81 D82 K42 L83 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:umiodp:62017&r=spo |
| By: | Robert, Ruszkowski |
| Abstract: | The European Football Championship (Euro 2012) organized in Poland became the pretext for a number of infrastructural changes at a total cost of 100 billion PLN2012. Such high expenditure makes the Polish event the most expensive among events of this magnitude. The fact that these changes were 100% financed by public means raises the question whether these funds were used in a substantiated way. Therefore, the aim of this study is to estimate the willingness-to-pay (WTP) among the community of the Pomeranian region, in connection with intangible benefits and costs stemming from hosting the Euro 2012 in Gdansk. A survey conducted among 407 respondents was the source of information. The results of the study show that the average value of WTPbenefit for the whole sample was 45,72 PLN2012 and WTPcost was 3,86 PLN2012. The aggregate values for the whole region was in terms of benefits and costs 396,6 million PLN2012 and 33,49 million PLN2012 respectively. The results thus confirm the existence of both intangible benefits and costs associated with the event. However, it should be noted that the importance of the net benefits is insignificant and does not compensate for the massive expenditure from public sources. |
| Keywords: | Mega sport event, Football arena, CVM, WTP |
| JEL: | H42 |
| Date: | 2017–08–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:80581&r=spo |
| By: | Chang Wang; Dries Goossens; Martina Vandebroek |
| Abstract: | In the past decade, television broadcasters have been investing a huge amount of money for the Belgian Pro League broadcasting rights. These companies pursue an audience rating maximization, which depends heavily on the schedule of the league matches. At the same time, clubs try to maximize their home attendance and find themselves affected by the schedule as well. Our paper aims to capture the Belgian soccer fans’ preferences with respect to scheduling options, both for watching matches on TV and in the stadium. We carried out a discrete choice experiment using an online survey questionnaire distributed on a national scale. The choice sets are based on three match characteristics: month, kickoff time, and quality of the opponent. The first part of this survey concerns television broadcasting aspects. The second part includes questions about stadium attendance. The choice data is first analyzed with a conditional logit model which assumes homogenous preferences. Then a mixed logit model is fit to model the heterogeneity among the fans. The estimates are used to calculate the expected utility of watching a Belgian Pro League match for every possible setting, either on TV or in the stadium. These predictions are validated in terms of the real audience rating and home attendance data. Our results can be used to improve the scheduling process of the Belgian Pro League in order to persuade more fans to watch the matches on TV or in a stadium. |
| Keywords: | Audience ratings, Belgian soccer, Conditional logit model, Discrete choice experiment, Mixed logit model, Schedule, Stadium attendance |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:kbiper:588528&r=spo |
| By: | Radek Janhuba (CERGE-EI, a joint workplace of Charles University and the Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Politickych veznu 7, 111 21 Prague, Czech Republic); Kristyna Cechova (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Smetanovo nabrezi 6, 111 01 Prague 1, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | Economists have found mixed evidence on what happens when the number of police increases. On the one hand, more law enforcers means higher probability of detecting a crime, which is known as monitoring effect. On the other hand, criminals incorporate this increase into their decision making process and thus may commit less crimes, constituting the deterrence effect. This study analyzes the effects of an increase in the number of on-field college football officials, taking players as potential criminals and officials as law enforcers. Analyzing a novel play by play dataset from two seasons of college football, we report evidence of a monitoring effect being present in the overall dataset. This effect is mainly driven by offensive penalties which are called in the area of jurisdiction of the added official. The decomposition of the effect provides a limited evidence for the presence of the deterrence effect in the case of penalties with severe punishment and committed by teams with moderately high ability. |
| Keywords: | Football, Official, Crime, Deterrence |
| JEL: | H43 K14 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2017_13&r=spo |
| By: | Dmitry Dagaev (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Andrey Zubanov (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We propose a theoretical model of a round-robin tournament with limited resources motivated by the fact that in a real-world round-robin sport tournament participating teams are sometimes forced to distribute their effort over an extended period. We assume that the participating teams have a limited amount of effort that must be distributed between all matches. We model the outcome of each match as a first-price sealed-bid auction. Results are aggregated after all matches are played with respect to the number of wins. The teams distribute their effort striving to maximize the expected payoff at tournament completion. For a three team tournament, we describe the set of all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. For tournaments with a relatively low first prize, we found two types of equilibria: ‘effort-saving’ and ‘burning out’, both leading to unequal payoffs. In contrast, for tournaments with a large first prize a limited budget of effort, in general, does not allow for the first or the last move advantage to be exploited. |
| Keywords: | contest, round-robin tournament, limited resources, first-price auction, first-mover advantage. |
| JEL: | C73 D44 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:171/ec/2017&r=spo |