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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | BALLIAUW, Matteo; VERLINDEN, Thomas; VAN DEN SPIEGEL, Tomas; VAN HECKE, Jani |
| Abstract: | In professional tennis, the income is distributed very unequal among the different levels. This paper quantifies and analyses the prize money income and costs of professional tennis players from a sports economics viewpoint. The current prize money distribution is linked to the organisational structure of tennis. Because of high career investment costs, it is difficult for players with a ranking below 250 to cover their expenses. Interviews with all involved stakeholder groups were held to gain deeper insight in the current issues and to formulate possible solutions to come to a more acceptable and sustainable individual financial model of professional tennis. Less players should consider themselves professionals. The professional players should compete for increased and more horizontally distributed prize money. The other players may opt for a semi-professional status. In addition, the junior development track for promising talented players cannot be neglected, in order to guarantee the future development of the sport. |
| Keywords: | Tennis, Income inequality, Financial model, Organisational policy, Sports economics |
| Date: | 2017–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2017006&r=spo |
| By: | Elaad, Guy; Kantor, Jeffrey; Krumer, Alex |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study the relationship between corruption, as measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and the probability of determining the outcome of a contest in a real competitive setting, in which agents in different countries are faced with exactly the same task under fixed and known rules. To that end, we utilize data from sensitive soccer matches in 75 countries during the period 2001 and 2013. In these matches, one team was in immediate danger of being relegated to a lower division (Team A) and another team was not affected by the result (Team B). Using within-country variation, we find that the more corrupt the country, the higher the probability is for Team A to achieve the desired result to avoid relegation in the sensitive matches relative to achieving this result in other, non-sensitive matches against the same team. We also find that in the later stages of the following year, the probability of Team A to lose against Team B compared to losing against a similar team (usually better than Team B) is significantly higher in more corrupt countries than in less corrupt countries. This result serves as a suggestive evidence of a quid pro quo behavior. Our findings indicate that the virus of corruption, as measured by the CPI, may infect social activities that are not necessarily directly linked to governmental activities. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, cultural norms, soccer |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D20 Z20 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:econwp:2017:08&r=spo |