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on Sports and Economics |
By: | René Böheim; Christoph Freudenthaler (Department of Economic, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria); Mario Lackner |
Abstract: | We analyze gender differences in risk-taking in high-pressure situations. Using novel data from professional athletes (NBA and WNBA), we find that male teams increase their risktaking towards the end of matches when a successful risky strategy could secure winning the match. Female teams, in contrast, reduce their risk-taking in these situations. The less time left in a match, the larger is the gap. When the costs of an unsuccessful risky strategy are very large (losing the tournament), we find no increase in risk-taking for male teams. |
Keywords: | Risk-taking, gender differences, tournament incentives |
JEL: | D81 J16 L83 |
Date: | 2016–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2016_08&r=spo |
By: | Barry Reilly (Department of Economics, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9RF, UK); Robert Witt (School of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH, UK) |
Abstract: | This paper uses player/match level data drawn from five playing seasons of the English Premiership League (EPL) to test for the presence of a refereeing susceptibility to social pressure in the application of soccer’s commonest sanction, the yellow disciplinary card. Using both player-specific fixed and random effects models, tentative support for the proposition is uncovered. The estimated effect, however, is found to be negligible in magnitude and unlikely to influence match outcomes in a meaningful way. |
Keywords: | Disciplinary Sanction, Referees, Social pressure |
JEL: | C23 D81 L83 |
Date: | 2016–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sus:susewp:08816&r=spo |