nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2017‒01‒22
four papers chosen by
João Carlos Correia Leitão
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Are women or men better team managers? Evidence from professional team sports By Helmut Dietl; Carlos Gomez-Gonzalez; Cornel Nesseler
  2. The Impact of Government Subsidies in Professional Team Sports Leagues By Helmut Dietl; Markus Lang; Cornel Nesseler
  3. Momentum in tennis: Controlling the match By Helmut Dietl; Cornel Nesseler
  4. Nash at Wimbledon: Evidence from Half a Million Serves By Romain Gauriot; Lionel Page; John Wooders

  1. By: Helmut Dietl (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Carlos Gomez-Gonzalez (Facultad Derecho y CC. Soziales, University of Castilla-La Mancha); Cornel Nesseler (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: We empirically compare the performance of female and male team managers. We find that female team managers never perform worse than male team managers and that females work under significantly worse conditions than males. Additionally, we find that specialized experience has no influence. Special- 1 ized experience means having worked previously as an employee in the same industry. Our dataset consists of female and male managers in women soccer leagues acroos countries, viz., France, Germany, and Norway. Managers in team sports usually have exactly the same tasks (selection, coordination, and motivation of team members) as team managers in other industries. The limited number of women in top management positions in some of these industries and the lack of available data do not often allow comparisons. Our study, which includes a fair number of female team managers and a clear measurement of performance, can help understanding stereotypical behaviors. Therefore, our results have important implications for industries, companies, and clubs who oppose employing female team managers.
    Keywords: Performance, Female managers, discrimination, Working conditions
    JEL: J16 J7 L83
    Date: 2017–01
  2. By: Helmut Dietl (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Markus Lang (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Cornel Nesseler (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: This article develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the effect of subsidies on player salaries, competitive balance, club profits, and welfare. Within this model, fan demand depends on win percentage, competitive balance, and aggregate talent. The results show that if a large market club receives a subsidy and fans have a relatively strong preference for aggregate talent, compared to competitive balance and own team winning percentage, club rofits and welfare increase for both clubs. If the small-market club is subsidized, a small subsidy increases competitive balance and player salaries of both clubs.
    Keywords: Subsidy, team sports, competitive balance, social welfare
    JEL: L83
    Date: 2017–01
  3. By: Helmut Dietl (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Cornel Nesseler (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: Although many studies examine if players in sports and especially in tennis bene t from a psychological or physiological boost (momentum) none examine whether the set score as a dependent variable or tournament rounds as independent variables are important determinants when assessing momentum. We empirically investigate whether professional female and male tennis players benefit from momentum. In contrast to previous work, we nd players we find players bene t from momentum as long as they control a match. Once players lose control over a match, they have a signi cantly lower chance to win the next set than their opponent. This loss of control results in what we call anti-momentum.
    Keywords: Momentum, anti-momentum, control theory, tennis
    JEL: L83
    Date: 2017–01
  4. By: Romain Gauriot; Lionel Page; John Wooders
    Abstract: Minimax and its generalization to mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is the cornerstone of our understanding of strategic situations that require decision makers to be unpredictable. Using a dataset of nearly half a million serves from over 3000 matches, we examine whether the behavior of professional tennis players is consistent with the Minimax Hypothesis. The large number of matches in our dataset requires the development of a novel statistical test, which we show is more powerful than the tests used in prior related studies. We find that win rates conform remarkably closely to the theory for men, but conform somewhat less neatly for women. We show that the behavior in the field of more highly ranked (i.e., better) players conforms more closely to theory.
    Date: 2016–10–13

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