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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Craig A. Depken II; Johnny Ducking; Peter A. Groothuis |
| Abstract: | Using a panel of National Hockey League players from 2000 through 2013, we analyze the determinants of career length in the league. In our analysis, we include both performance variables and nationality of origin to determine their importance in determining career length. We find that European-born players have shorter careers than North American-born players holding performance constant and Russian-born players have even shorter careers than other Europeans. We further find that Russian-born players have even shorter careers than other players after the 2005 lockout. These shorter careers are consistent with exit discrimination against European and Russian players pushing them out of the league and voluntary exit by European and Russian players due to opportunities in their home countries pulling them out of the league. Ironically, voluntary exit by European and Russian players provides teams with a financial incentive to discriminate against European players. Key Words: Exit discrimination, competing leagues, professional sports, return migration |
| JEL: | Z22 L83 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:16-10&r=spo |
| By: | Karol Kempa (University of Giessen); Hannes Rusch (VU Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an empirical investigation of severe misconducts in contests based on data from European football championships. We differentiate between two types of severe misconducts both resulting in a yellow card, namely dissents with the referee and other misconducts, and between sanctioned behaviour of team captains and other players. Confirming the existing literature, we find that sabotage against the opponent is used more frequently by players from teams with lower ability. In addition, we find that dissents with the referee are significantly more likely in the case of an unfavourable score. We further find that captains, in contrast to other players, seem to use sabotage less impulsively and more strategically, as they do not seem to participate in retaliatory escalation of conflict behaviour. However, compared to other players, captains increase their sabotage in important matches. |
| Keywords: | Contest; Dissent; Leadership; Sabotage; Footbal |
| JEL: | D74 L83 M52 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201629&r=spo |
| By: | Cervený, Jakub (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); van Ours, Jan (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); van Tuijl, Martin (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | We examine the effect of the sending-o of a player on the goal-scoring rates in FIFA World Cup matches in tournaments from 1998 to 2014. We use a hazard rate framework in which the effect of a red card is modeled as a shift in the goal-scoring rate. A red card may harm the team that receives a red card and may be beneficial for their opponent. Indeed, we find that the goal-scoring rate of the sanctioned team goes down, while the goal-scoring rate of the non-sanctioned team goes up. |
| Keywords: | assocation football; goal-scoring; red card; world cup foorball matches |
| JEL: | Z00 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:0801d15e-57b6-4e14-a6b9-4a245fc257d9&r=spo |
| By: | Craig A. Depken II; Peter A. Groothuis; Mark C. Strazicich |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the time series properties of fighting and scoring in the National Hockey League from 1957-2013. The empirical analysis focuses on identifying structural breaks in the various time series and correlating these breaks with rule changes in the NHL, especially those that focus on fighting. We find that player behavior in the areas of fighting and scoring changed structurally before rule changes in the NHL that reduced the benefits and increased the costs of fighting. The data and empirical results suggest that the rise and fall of the enforcer was a function of changes in social norms within the NHL rather than legal changes by the league itself. The example suggests that other sports might also experience changes in social norms that lead to reduced violence and increased offense before formal rule changes are made by league officials. Key Words: Social Norms, Cultural Change, Rule Changes, Structural Breaks |
| JEL: | Z22 D71 L83 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:16-12&r=spo |
| By: | James Richard Hill; Peter A. Groothuis |
| Abstract: | The influx of international players into the NBA has led researchers to investigate whether either pay discrimination or a pay premium exists for these new entrants. The results have been mixed. An early article, Escher et al. (2004) find evidence that foreign-born NBA players are paid a wage premium. Using a two-stage double fixed-effect model, Yang and Lin (2012), however, find evidence of salary discrimination against international players when analyzing the 1999 through 2008 seasons. Then Hoffer and Freidel (2014) using a cross sectional approach find a wage premium for the 2010-2011 season. Using similar techniques with a longer unbalanced panel dataset (1989-2013) that covers all the years of the previous studies we test for the robustness of the results. We suggest that discrimination results are quite sensitive to the specifications and techniques used. We find that many of the results are not robust and that foreign wage premiums exist only for early foreign entrants and neither pay discrimination nor a wage premium exist after the 1996 season. Key Words: Wage Discrimination. NBA, International Labor Market |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:16-11&r=spo |