|
on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Lionel Page; Markus Schaffner; Marie Beigelman |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether variations in players' market values across positions in Association Football (soccer) reflect variations in contribution to the team on-field performance. Using data from the British Premier League, we find that the marginal effect of strikers' (and to some extent goal keepers') market value on team performance is lower than for other players. This suggests that strikers are overpriced relative to other players. The market value of these players is less related to their on-field performance than for players placed in defence or in mid-field. |
| Keywords: | sports economics; professional team sports; efficiency wages |
| Date: | 2016–06–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:qubewp:wp043&r=spo |
| By: | Dilger, Alexander; Bakkenbüll, Linn-Brit |
| Abstract: | In diesem Beitrag werden erstens positive Zahlungsbereitschaften für sportliche Erfolge der deutschen Mannschaft bei den Olympischen Winterspielen 2014 in Sotschi untersucht und zweitens die positive oder auch negative Zahlungsbereitschaft für die Austragung Olympischer Spiele in Deutschland. Wichtige positive Faktoren der Zahlungsbereitschaft für einen vorderen deutschen Platz im Medaillenspiegel sind Interesse am Wintersport, das Verfolgen der Winterspiele, die Einschätzung einer hohen nationalen Bedeutung eines guten Abschneidens und ein eher niedriges Einkommen (1.000 bis 2.000 € statt über 4.000 €). Signifikant negativ in den Schätzungen sind interessanterweise eigenes Sporttreiben, eine höhere Identifikation mit der deutschen Mannschaft und ein mittleres Alter. Hochgerechnet auf Deutschland ergibt sich eine aggregierte Zahlungsbereitschaft von 2,7, 1,6 bzw. 1,0 Mrd. € für einen ersten, zweiten oder dritten deutschen Platz im Medaillenspiegel, während für eine einzige Goldmedaille in der jeweiligen Lieblingssportart die aggregiert Zahlungsbereitschaft bei 5,2 Mrd. € läge. Für eine Austragung Olympischer Spiele in Deutschlang gibt es aggregiert eine positive Zahlungsbereitschaft von 6,7 Mrd. €, der jedoch Kompensationsforderungen in Höhe von 3,1 Mrd. € gegenüberstehen, was zu einem positiven Saldo von 3,6 Mrd. € führt. @We analyse the positive willingness to pay for sportive success of the German team at the Winter Olympics in Sotschi as well as the positive or negative willingness to pay for hosting Olympic Games in Germany. Important positive factors of the willingness to pay for a German front place in the medal table are interest in winter sports, watching the Winter Olympics, seeing a high national relevance of a good German performance and a lower income (between € 1.000 and € 2.000 instead of over € 4.000). Interestingly, practising sport by oneself, a higher identification with the German team and being middle-aged are significantly negative in the regressions. Extrapolated the aggregated willingness to pay is € 2.7, 1.6 or 1.0 billion for a first, second or third place of Germany in the medal table. The aggregated willingness to pay for a single gold medal in the respective favourite discipline would be € 5.2 billion. The aggregated positive willingness to pay to host Olympic Games in Germany is € 6.7 billion. However, there is also a demand of € 3.1 billion for compensations such that the net total is € 3.6 billion. |
| JEL: | D12 D61 D62 H41 H43 L83 Z21 Z38 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:umiodp:052016&r=spo |
| By: | Baert, Stijn (Ghent University); Amez, Simon (Ghent University) |
| Abstract: | We test the soccer myth suggesting that a particularly good moment to score a goal is just before half time. To this end, rich data on 1,179 games played in the UEFA Champions League and UEFA Europa League are analysed. In contrast to the myth, we find that, conditional on the goal difference and other game characteristics at half time, the final goal difference at the advantage of the home team is 0.520 goals lower in case of a goal just before half time by this team. We show that this finding relates to this team's lower probability of scoring a goal during the second half. |
| Keywords: | soccer, sports, goal scoring, fixed effects regression models |
| JEL: | L83 J44 Z00 |
| Date: | 2016–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9980&r=spo |
| By: | Francesco De Sinopoli (Department of Economics, University of Verona); Claudia Meroni (Department of Economics, University of Verona); Carlos Pimienta (School of Economics, UNSW Business School, UNSW) |
| Abstract: | A tournament is a simultaneous n-player game that is built on a two-player game g. We generalize Arad and Rubinstein’s model assuming that every player meets each of his opponents twice to play a (possibly) asymmetric game g in alternating roles (using sports terminology, once "at home" and once "away"). The winner of the tournament is the player who attains the highest total score, which is given by the sum of the payoffs that he gets in all the matches he plays. We explore the relationship between the equilibria of the tournament and the equilibria of the game g. We prove that limit points of equilibria of tournaments as the number of players goes to infinity are equilibria of g. Such a refinement criterion is satisfied by strict equilibria. Being able to analyze arbitrary two-player games allows us to study meaningful economic applications that are not symmetric, such as the ultimatum game. |
| Keywords: | tournaments, asymmetric games, ultimatum game, double round-robin |
| JEL: | C72 C73 D70 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-04&r=spo |