nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2016‒04‒30
two papers chosen by
João Carlos Correia Leitão
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Which countries bid for the Olympic Games? Economic, political, and social factors and chances of winning By Wolfgang Maennig; Christopher Vierhaus
  2. To the highest bidder: The market for talent in sports leagues By Roberto Burguet; Jozsef Sakovics

  1. By: Wolfgang Maennig (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg); Christopher Vierhaus (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg)
    Abstract: This contribution analyzes 132 factors on their potential to discriminate countries bidding for hosting the Olympic Games from non-bidding countries. Our binary, clustered model using generalized estimating equations (GEE) shows that countries recording long-term economic growth and pursuing a liberalization and globalization policy will consider an Olympic bid. In addition, countries with an urban population above 10 million, with stable election results and an improvement in health standards as well as more attractive tourism destinations are more likely to bid for the Olympic Games. Finally, the bid decision is shaped by experience in hosting major sports events, a country and regional rotation, persistence and climatic conditions.
    Keywords: Olympic Summer Games, mega events, bidding, host city election, IOC, decision-making
    JEL: R58 L83
    Date: 2016–04–05
  2. By: Roberto Burguet; Jozsef Sakovics
    Abstract: We present a realistic and novel micro-structure for the market for athletes in league sports. In our trading mechanism the clubs bid for individual players, internalizing the effect that a player not hired might play for the competition. For inelastic talent supply, our (wage minimizing) equilibrium supports the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is independent of initial ownership and revenue sharing arrangements. When talent supply is elastic, revenue sharing decreases the aggregate amount of talent hired. This negative effect on the talent level may be efficiency enhancing when the competition for talent results in excess talent being hired. For the first time in the literature, we carry out our entire analysis using a newly formulated, unspecified club objective, incorporating both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.
    Date: 2016–04–21

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