By: |
Yvon Rocaboy (CREM, UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France) |
Abstract: |
It is often supposed that the stakeholders of a national football league draw
more satisfaction from their sport if the league is balanced. This is the
so-called Competitive balance hypothesis. If there exists an international
competition like the European champions league, this hypothesis can be
challenged however. The utility of national leagues’ stakeholders could be
higher, the higher the probability of winning of their representative club at
the international level. If it is correct, a league’s governing body intending
to maximise the quality of the national league by making use of redistributive
schemes would face a tradeoff between national competitive balance and
international performance of the national representative club. We propose a
simple microeconomic framework to model this tradeoff. If there exists a
non-cooperative game among the national league governing bodies, whether it is
a Nash or a Stackelberg one, this game would result in inefficient
redistributive policies. We find "soft" empirical evidences suggesting that
such a competition occurs among the big 5 football leagues in Europe. This
result supports the idea of the creation of an international regulatory body.
We derive the conditions under which the international regulatory body should
ensure that the leagues’ governing bodies implement redistributive schemes
guaranteeing the respect of the national competitive balance. We also
emphasize the risk of experiencing a drop in the quality of leagues if one of
them becomes too big relatively to the others, what we call the tragedy of the
wealthy. |
Keywords: |
Sports economics, National football leagues, International football league, Interleague competition, Competitive balance, Regulation of sports, European football champions league |
JEL: |
J3 D3 L5 L83 |
Date: |
2015–07 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201509&r=spo |