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on Sports and Economics |
By: | Nejat Anbarci; Ching-Jen Sun; M. Utku Unver |
Abstract: | In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria each of the skill-balanced teams has exactly 50% chance to win whenever the score is tied at any round. Consistent with empirical evidence, we show that the current mechanism is not sequentially fair and characterize all sequentially fair mechanisms. Taking additional desirable properties into consideration, we propose and uniquely characterize a practical mechanism. |
Keywords: | Fairness, mechanism design, soccer, penalty shootouts, market design, axiomatic approach |
JEL: | D63 C79 |
Date: | 2015–02–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dkn:econwp:eco_2015_5&r=spo |
By: | Csató, László |
Abstract: | The paper uses paired comparison-based scoring procedures for ranking the participants of a Swiss system chess team tournament. We present the main challenges of ranking in Swiss system, the features of individual and team competitions as well as the failures of official lexicographical orders. The tournament is represented as a ranking problem, our model is discussed with respect to the properties of the score, generalized row sum and least squares methods. The proposed procedure is illustrated with a detailed analysis of the two recent chess team European championships. Final rankings are compared by their distances and visualized with multidimensional scaling (MDS). Differences to official ranking are revealed by the decomposition of least squares method. Rankings are evaluated by prediction accuracy, retrodictive performance, and stability. The paper argues for the use of least squares method with a results matrix favoring match points. |
Keywords: | paired comparison, ranking, least squares method, Swiss system, chess |
JEL: | D71 |
Date: | 2015–01–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cvh:coecwp:2015/01&r=spo |