nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2014‒12‒24
five papers chosen by
João Carlos Correia Leitão
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. In-Season Head-Coach Dismissals and the Performance of Professional Football Teams By van Ours, J.C.; van Tuijl, M.A.
  2. Do Fans Care about Compliance to Doping Regulations in Sports? The Impact of PED Suspension in Baseball By Pascal Courty; Jeffrey Cisyk
  3. The Effects of Elite Sports on Later Job Success By Ralf Dewenter; Leonie Giessing
  4. Who Benefits from Globalization of Labor? Evidence from the 'Bosman Ruling' By Dafeng Xu
  5. The Economics of Corruption in Sports – The Special Case of Doping By Dimant, Eugen; Deutscher, Christian

  1. By: van Ours, J.C. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); van Tuijl, M.A. (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
    Abstract: This paper studies the causes and consequences of in-season changes of the headcoach of association football teams. We exploit data from the highest level of Dutch professional football during 14 successive seasons. An in-season change of the head-coach depends on recent match results and the difference between actual results and expectations as measured using bookmaker data. We find that, after the head-coach has been replaced, teams perform better than before. However, the performance is also better than before for a control group of coach replacements that did not occur. From this we conclude that replacement of head-coaches does not improve team performance.
    Keywords: association football; coaches; performance
    JEL: J44 L83
    Date: 2014
  2. By: Pascal Courty (Department of Economics, University of Victoria); Jeffrey Cisyk
    Abstract: There is little evidence in support of the main economic rationale for regulating athletic doping: that doping reduces fan interest. The introduction of random testing for performance-enhancing drugs (PED) by Major League Baseball (MLB) offers unique data to investigate the issue. The announcement of a PED violation: (a) initially reduces home-game attendance by 8 percent, (b) has no impact on home-game attendance after 15 days, and (c) has a small negative impact on the game attendance for other MLB teams. This is the first systematic evidence that doping decreases consumer demand for sporting events.
    Keywords: Performance Enhancing Drug, Doping, Baseball, Major Baseball League, Attendance
    JEL: L83 D01
    Date: 2014–12–02
  3. By: Ralf Dewenter; Leonie Giessing
    Abstract: This paper analyses the income effect of the participation in elite sports. To quantify the average difference in the monthly net income of former elite athletes and non-athletes we estimate sample average treatment effect scores (SATT) by using covariate nearest-neighbour matching (CVM). While our treatment group consists of formerly funded top-level athletes, the control group of non-athletes is drawn from the SOEP database. Matching takes place by socio-demographic variables as well as measures of personal qualities and attitudes. On average, former athletes receive higher incomes than similar non-athletes. The income premium for former team sports and male athletes is even higher. Comparing the income of former female athletes with male non-athletes, we find that the participation in elite sports closes the gender-wage gap. Our results are robust to variations in the specification and statistically as well economically significant.
    Keywords: Funding of elite sports, nearest-neighbor matching, job success, gender-wage gap
    JEL: C49 J30 L83
    Date: 2014
  4. By: Dafeng Xu
    Abstract: As an old Chinese proverb says, "visiting monks give better sermons." European soccer clubs also believe this, and have always been seeking for foreign players to boost competitiveness. However, due to the reason of protectionism, there were restrictions that each club was only allowed to field up to three foreign players. In 1995, the "Bosman Ruling" was made, resulting that restrictions on foreign players were widely relaxed for soccer clubs in the European Union (EU), and the European soccer market has become highly globalized since then. Due to the nature of soccer competitions, it is impossible that the "Bosman Ruling" improves sporting performance for all clubs. It thus raises a question: who benefits from globalization of labor? From the perspective of economic inequality, will this ruling affect competitive balance of soccer leagues in Europe? This paper examines the pre- and post-Bosman change of the sporting performance distance between previously strong clubs and lower-ranking clubs in 32 premier soccer leagues in Europe. We notice the problem in the previous literature that estimations of the treatment effect of the "Bosman Ruling" are confounded with other soccer policy and rule changes. To solve this problem, we employ Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences (DDD) to control for omitted variables. Because the "Bosman Ruling" was made within the EU, it naturally created a Bosman region and a non-Bosman region. Using DDD, the treatment effect of the "Bosman Ruling" is identified at the distance-region-period level. Based on two sporting performance measures, i.e., the points per match and the goal difference per match, we estimate that the distance between previously strong and lower-ranking clubs increased by at least 20% in the post-Bosman period. Somewhat surprisingly, it is the distance between previously strong and median-ranking clubs that increased most, though the general pattern is that all lower-ranking clubs suffered loss. We also conduct IV regressions of the pre- and post-Bosman change of the distance between previously strong and lower-ranking clubs on the pre- and post-Bosman change of the number of foreign players in previously strong clubs. OLS can raise the endogeneity problem because sporting performance might also affect transfer decisions of foreign players. Therefore, we use the treatment variable (i.e., the dummy describing whether the club is in the Bosman region) as the instrument of the regressor, i.e., pre- and post-Bosman change of the number of foreign players. Similar with DDD estimations, we find that the influx of foreign players caused that the distance between previously strong and lower-ranking clubs increased after the "Bosman Ruling". Using both DDD and IV, we observe that previously strong clubs significantly benefited from globalization of labor. Soccer leagues in Europe became more unbalanced after the "Bosman Ruling".
    JEL: L83 P25 R23
    Date: 2014–11
  5. By: Dimant, Eugen; Deutscher, Christian
    Abstract: Corruption in general and doping in particular are ubiquitous in both amateur and professional sports and have taken the character of a systemic threat. In creating unfair advantages, doping distorts the level playing field in sporting competition. With higher stakes involved, such distortions create negative externalities not only on the individual level (e.g. lasting health damages) but also frictions on the aggregate level (e.g. loss of media interest) and erode the principle of sports. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive literature overview of the individual drivers to dope, the concomitant detrimental effects and respective countermeasures. In explaining the athlete’s motivation to use performance enhancing drugs, we enrich the discussion by adapting insights from behavioral economics. These insights help to understand such an athlete’s decision beyond a clear-cut rationale but rather as a product of the interaction with the underlying environment. We stress that in order to ensure clean sports and fair competition, more sophisticated measurement methods have to be evolved and the respective data made publicly available in order to facilitate more extensive studies in the future. So far, the lack of data is alarming, especially in the area of elite sports where the stakes are high and doping has a substantial influence.
    Keywords: Sports, Doping, Corruption, Countermeasures, Survey
    JEL: D73 K42 L83
    Date: 2014–12

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