By: |
Che, XiaoGang (University of Alberta, Department of Economics);
Humphreys, Brad (University of Alberta, Department of Economics) |
Abstract: |
We analyze the formation of rival leagues in professional team sports, one of
the least studied forms of competition in sport. We survey the economic
history of professional sports leagues in North America and develop stylized
facts about rival league formation and develop a game-theoretic model of entry
of a rival league to an existing market to explain these stylized facts. This
model accounts for the strategic interaction between the incumbent and rival
league and costs associated with acquiring new players from the incumbent
league. The model predicts that either expanding to deter rival league
formation, or allowing a rival league to form and then merging with that
league is a subgame perfect equilibrium, and that incumbent leagues will pay
players relatively high salaries to deter entry by a rival league. |
Keywords: |
professional team sports; rival league; monopsony |
JEL: |
D42 L12 L83 |
Date: |
2012–10–01 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2012_023&r=spo |