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on Sports and Economics |
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Issue of 2012‒01‒03
three papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon |
| By: | Helmut Dietl (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Martin Grossmann (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Markus Lang (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-oriented behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance and club profits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional models, we show that revenue sharing does not always reduce investment incentives due to the dulling effect. We identify a new effect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening effect". In the presence of the sharpening effect (dulling effect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league. |
| Keywords: | Competitive balance, contest, invariance proposition, objective function, revenue sharing, team sports league, utility maximization |
| JEL: | L83 D43 C72 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsd:wpaper:0001&r=spo |
| By: | Jason M. Lindo; Isaac D. Swensen; Glen R. Waddell |
| Abstract: | We consider the relationship between collegiate-football success and non-athlete student performance. We find that the team's success significantly reduces male grades relative to female grades. This phenomenon is only present in fall quarters, which coincides with the football season. Using survey data, we find that males are more likely than females to increase alcohol consumption, decrease studying, and increase partying in response to the success of the team. Yet, females also report that their behavior is affected by athletic success, suggesting that their performance is likely impaired but that this effect is masked by the practice of grade curving. |
| JEL: | H0 I23 J16 |
| Date: | 2011–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17677&r=spo |
| By: | Brad R. Humphreys; Bruce K. Johnson; Daniel S. Mason; John C. Whitehead |
| Abstract: | We estimate Canadians’ willingness to pay (WTP) for success by Team Canada in the 2010 Winter Olympics. The Canadian government subsidized elite athletes in the run up to the 2010 Games through the Own the Podium program, which was designed to increase Canada’s medal count. WTP estimates from a contingent valuation method (CVM) study using data from nationally representative surveys before and after the Games suggest that Own the Podium generated intangible benefits of between 3 and 5 times its cost. The aggregate value of the intangible benefits generated by the program was between $719 million and $3.4 billion. Key Words: Olympic Games, contingent valuation method, willingness to pay |
| JEL: | H49 H59 L83 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:11-20&r=spo |