nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2011‒11‒28
three papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Sports and Child Development By Felfe, Christina; Lechner, Michael; Steinmayr, Andreas
  2. On the Release of Players to National Teams By Oliver Guertler; Markus Lang; Tim Pawlowski
  3. Beauty and Productivity:The Case of the Ladies Professional Golf Association By Seung Chan Ahn; Young Hoon Lee

  1. By: Felfe, Christina (University of St. Gallen); Lechner, Michael (University of St. Gallen); Steinmayr, Andreas (University of St. Gallen)
    Abstract: Despite the relevance of cognitive and non-cognitive skills for professional success, their formation is not yet fully understood. This study fills part of this gap by analyzing the effect of sports club participation, one of the most popular extra-curricular activities, on children's skill development. Our results indicate positive effects: both cognitive skills, measured by school performance, and overall non-cognitive skills improve by 0.13 standard deviations. The results are robust when using alternative datasets as well as alternative estimation and identification strategies. The effects can be partially explained by increased physical activities replacing passive leisure activities.
    Keywords: skill formation, non-cognitive skills, physical activity, semi-parametric estimation
    JEL: J24 J13 I12
    Date: 2011–11
  2. By: Oliver Guertler (Department of Economics, University of Cologne); Markus Lang (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich); Tim Pawlowski (Department of Sport Economics and Sport Management, German Sport University Cologne)
    Abstract: The release of players from a club to the national team often leads to a conflict concerning the duration of the players' stay with the national team. Based on a theoretical bargaining model, we examine whether intervention by a governing body in this conflict is desirable. We show that bargaining between club and national team yields a socially inefficient outcome if financial compensations are either prohibited or limited. If, however, unlimited financial compensations paid by the national team to the clubs are allowed, it is not necessary to intervene in the negotiations because the bargaining outcome will be socially optimal.
    Keywords: National team, release of players, compensation payment, bargaining, team sports
    JEL: C78 L83
    Date: 2011–11
  3. By: Seung Chan Ahn (Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-9801, U.S.A & Department of Economics, Sogang University, Seoul); Young Hoon Lee (Department of Economics, Sogang University, Seoul)
    Abstract: There is much evidence that attractive looking workers earn more than average-looking workers, even after controlling for a variety of individual characteristics. The presence of such beauty premiums may influence the labor supply decisions of attractive workers. For example, if one unit of a product by an attractive worker is more rewarded than that by her less attractive coworker, the attractive worker may put more effort into improving her productivity. We examine this possibility by analyzing panel data for individual female golfers participating in the Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) tour. We find that attractive golfers record lower average scores and earn more prize money than average-looking players, even when controlling for player experience and other variables related to their natural talents. This finding is consistent with the notion that physical appearance is associated with individual workers' accumulation of human capital or skills. If the human capital of attractive workers is at least partly an outcome of favoritism toward beauty, then the premium estimates obtained by many previous studies may have been downwardly biased.
    JEL: J3 J7 L8
    Date: 2011

This nep-spo issue is ©2011 by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.