| By: |
Cornaglia, Francesca (Queen Mary, University of London);
Feldman, Naomi E. (Ben Gurion University) |
| Abstract: |
Using a sample of professional baseball players from 1871–2007, this paper
aims at analyzing a longstanding empirical observation that married men earn
significantly more than their single counterparts holding all else equal (the
"marriage premium"). Baseball is a unique case study because it has a long
history of statistics collection and numerous direct measurements of
productivity. Our results show that the marriage premium also holds for
baseball players, where married players earn up to 16 percent more than those
who are not married, even after controlling for selection. The results hold
only for players in the top third of the ability distribution and post 1975
when changes in the rules that govern wage contracts allowed for players to be
valued closer to their true market price. Nonetheless, there do not appear to
be clear differences in productivity between married and nonmarried players.
We discuss possible reasons why employers may discriminate in favor of married
men. |
| Keywords: |
marriage premium, wage gap, productivity, baseball |
| JEL: |
J31 J44 J70 |
| Date: |
2011–05 |
| URL: |
https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5695 |