nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2010‒07‒17
four papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. When Drains and Gains Coincide: Migration and International Football Performance By Ruxanda Berlinschi; Jeroen Schokkaert; Johan F.M. Swinnen
  2. The law of unintended consequences in soccer: impact of three-point-a-win rule on strategies and outcomes By Oleksandr Shepotylo
  3. Betting in the Shadow of Match-Fixing By Parimal Kanti Bag; Bibhas Saha
  4. Configuration d’un champ institutionnel dans le cadre d’un méga-événement : le cas du championnat d’Europe de football By Muriel Mignerat; Luc K. Audebrand

  1. By: Ruxanda Berlinschi; Jeroen Schokkaert; Johan F.M. Swinnen
    Abstract: We analyze the effects of football player migration to foreign leagues on the performance of their home country national teams. We provide a theoretical model predicting a positive effect of migration on international football performance due to superior skills acquired by players choosing to migrate to foreign leagues. We test this prediction using recent cross country data on international football performance. In order to accurately measure the effect of skill acquisitions by migrating players, we construct a weighted migration index that takes into account the quality of the foreign league and the division in which national team players are employed. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that migration of players to foreign leagues improves international football performance of their home countries.
    Keywords: Migration, Muscle Drain, International Football Performance
    JEL: J61 L83
    Date: 2010
  2. By: Oleksandr Shepotylo (Kyiv School of Economics, Kyiv Economics Institute)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes whether the three-point rule in soccer brought more action to the game for a large sample of European championships in 1990-1997, revealing team-specic heterogeneity of responses caused by differences in team tactics in the period prior to the rule change. Teams that relied more heavily on tie-intensive tactics dramatically changed their behavior towards more attacking style in away games, considerably reducing probability of a tie. Interestingly, even though the three-point rule signicantly reduced proportion of ties, it did not bring more goals into the game because the increased rewards of scoring when the current score is tied were oset by increased incentives of defending the current score when one team led.
    Keywords: heterogeneous response, soccer, sports, three-point system
    JEL: C40 L51 L83
    Date: 2010–06
  3. By: Parimal Kanti Bag (National University of Singapore); Bibhas Saha (School of Economics, University of East Anglia)
    Abstract: Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the `lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits but also admit match-fixing. When match-fixing occurs, it often involves bribery of only the strong team. The theoretical analysis is intended to address the problem of growing incidence of betting related corruption in world sports including cricket, horse races, tennis, soccer, basketball, wrestling, snooker, etc.
    Keywords: Sports betting, bookie, punters, corruption, match-fixing, lemons problem
    JEL: D42 K42
    Date: 2010–07–05
  4. By: Muriel Mignerat; Luc K. Audebrand
    Abstract: In this study of the last three UEFA European Football Championship (2000, 2004, 2008), we identify institutional entrepreneurs and examine the strategies they use to influence the institution they are part of (UEFA) through the introduction of new information technologies (e-ticketing, online and mobile broadcasting). We build on the literature related to institutional theory and field-configuring events to propose a framework of field configuring institutional change. Our preliminary results suggest that institutions are at play at several levels. For instance, a central key institution, the UEFA, is being maintained through the introduction of new practices (buffer institutions) such as e-ticketing during mega-events (EURO). We describe the type and nature of institutional work used by institutional entrepreneurs involved. <P>Dans cette étude des trois derniers championnats d’Europe de football (2000 – 2004 – 2008), nous identifions des entrepreneurs institutionnels et examinons les stratégies qu’ils utilisent pour influencer l’institution dont ils font partie (l’UEFA) au travers de l’introduction de nouvelles technologies de l’information (billetterie électronique, diffusion en ligne et mobile). Nous utilisons la littérature provenant, d’une part, de la théorie institutionnelle et, d’autre part, des événements configurateurs de champ (« Field Configuring Events » ou FCE) afin de proposer un cadre conceptuel du changement institutionnel. Nos résultats préliminaires suggèrent que les institutions œuvrent à plusieurs niveaux. En particulier, une institution clé, l’UEFA, est maintenue au travers de l’introduction de nouvelles pratiques (institutions tampon) telles que la vente électronique de billets durant les méga-événements (Euro). Nous décrivons le type et la nature du travail institutionnel effectués par les entrepreneurs institutionnels impliqués.
    Keywords: Field-configuring events; Institutional theory; Information technology; Mega-events; Sports; Football. , Événements configurateurs d’événements, théorie institutionnelle, technologies de l’information, méga-événements, sport, football
    Date: 2010–06–01

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