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on Sports and Economics |
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Issue of 2009‒09‒05
three papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao Polytechnic Institute of Portalegre and Technical University of Lisbon |
| By: | Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a theory of contests based on perceived abilities, and provides evidence for the predictions of this theory using panel data from professional soccer. We examine how soccer players perform in club matches during the informal)nomination contests for national teams prior to an important international Cup, the Euro 2008. Our differences-in-differences analysis uses players from nonqualified nations who play in the same league as a control group. We find a large positive effect of nomination contest participation on several output measures for players with intermediate chances of being nominated, as proxied by past national team participations. For players with no prior national team experience there is no significant effect. We also find support for the theory that players whose nomination is close to certain reduce their effort in order to avoid injuries or exhaustion prior to the Cup. Finally, any positive reaction is strongest for young players. |
| JEL: | I20 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:09027&r=spo |
| By: | Papahristodoulou, Christos |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the effects of a win bonus, effort, costs and team size, on the demand for talented players, the win percentage and the profits of small and big teams. Teams play a Cournot game, under the following objective functions: (i) teams maximize profits, (ii) teams maximize win percentage, (iii) the small team maximizes profit and the big win percentage, and (iv) vice versa. The effects are based on a priori selected parameter values and bounds, as well as from optimal solutions of non-linear programs, by maximizing anyone of the four win percentage formulae, derived from the respective Cournot reaction functions. |
| Keywords: | Teams; talents; effort; win bonus; win percentage; competitive balance; profits |
| JEL: | L83 D43 M21 |
| Date: | 2009–08–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:16989&r=spo |
| By: | Peter A. Groothuis; James Richard Hill |
| Abstract: | Cross sectional employment data is not random. Individuals who survive to a longer level of tenure tend to have a higher level of productivity than those who exit earlier. This result suggests that in cross sectional data high productivity workers are over-sampled at high levels of tenure. In wage equations using cross sectional data, results could be biased from the over sampling of high productive workers at long levels of tenure. This survival effect in cross sectional data could possibly bias the coefficient on tenure upwards. We explore techniques to correct for survival bias using a panel study of National Basketball Association players. In particular we focus on a modified Heckman selectivity bias procedure using duration models to correct for survival bias. Key Words: |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:09-19&r=spo |